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Abstract
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where each primary seeks to sell secondary access to its channel
at multiple locations. Transmission qualities of a channel evolve randomly. Each primary needs to select a price
and a set of non-interfering locations (which is an independent set in the conflict graph of the region) at which to
offer its channel without knowing the transmission qualities of the channels of its competitors. At each location each
secondary selects a channel depending on the price and the quality of the channels. We formulate the above problem
as a non-cooperative game. We consider two scenarios-i) when the region is small, ii) when the region is large. In
the first setting, we focus on a class of conflict graphs, known as mean valid graphs which commonly arise when
the region is small. We explicitly compute a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) that selects only a small number of
independent sets with positive probability. The NE is threshold type in that primaries only choose independent set
whose cardinality is greater than a certain threshold. The threshold on the cardinality increases with increase in quality
of the channel on sale. We show that the symmetric NE strategy profile is unique in a special class of conflict graphs
(linear graph) which commonly arises in practice. In the second setting, we consider node symmetric conflict graphs
which arises when the number of locations is large (potentially, infinite). We explicitly compute a symmetric NE
that randomizes equally among the maximum independent sets at a given channel state vector. In the NE a primary
only selects the maximum independent set at a given channel state vector. We show that the two symmetric NEs
computed in two settings exhibit important structural difference. We numerically evaluate the ratio of the expected
payoff attained by primaries in the game and the payoff attained by primaries when all the primaries collude.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Secondary access of the spectrum where license holders (primaries) allow unlicensed users (secondaries) to use
their channels can enhance the efficiency of the spectrum usage. However, secondary access will only proliferate
when it is rendered profitable to the primaries. We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primaries lease their
spectrum to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Each primary owns a channel throughout a large region
consisting of several locations. The channel of a primary provides a transmission rate to a secondary depending
on the state which evolves randomly and reflects the usage of the primary as well as the transmission rate due to
fading. We consider the state of a channel is 0, 1 . . . , or n where higher state corresponds to higher transmission
rate. A secondary receives a payoff from a channel depending on the transmission rate offered by the channel and
the price quoted by the primary. Secondaries buy those channels which give them the highest payoff, which leads
to a competition among primaries.
Price competition in economics and wireless setting ignore two important properties which distinguish spectrum
oligopoly from standard oligopolies: First, a primary selects a price knowing only the state of its own channel;
it is unaware of states of its competitors’ channels. Thus, if a primary quotes a high price, it will earn a large
profit if it sells its channel, but it may not be able to sell at all; on the other hand a low price will enhance the
probability of a sale but may also fetch lower profits in the event of a sale. Second, the same spectrum band can
be utilized simultaneously at geographically dispersed locations without interference; but the same band can not be
utilized simultaneously at interfering locations. This special feature known as spatial reuse adds another dimension
in the strategic interaction as now a primary has to cull a set of non-interfering locations, which is denoted as
an independent set in the conflict graph representation of the region [2]; at which to offer its channel apart from
selecting a price at every node of that set. Intuitively, a primary would like to make its channel available at an
independent set of the maximum size (cardinality). However, if the competition at the largest independent set is
intense, a primary may achieve higher payoff by setting high price at small independent sets (where the competition
is not so intense).
B. Our Contributions
We devise the problem as a game in which each primary’s strategy space consists of independent set selection
strategy and the pricing strategy at each node of the independent set when the channel is available for sale. When
the channel is in state 0, the transmission rate is very low and thus, we consider the channel is not available for
sale. We first show that there may exist multiple asymmetric NEs. Asymmetric NEs are difficult to implement in the
symmetric game that we consider (Section II-E). We, therefore, focus only on finding symmetric NEs subsequently.
We prove a separation theorem (Section III-C) which entails that the NE pricing strategy at each location can be
uniquely computed if the independent set selection strategy is known. By virtue of our previous work [3], [4] which
characterizes pricing strategies of primaries for different transmission rates when the region has only one location
(i.e. no spatial reuse). We then focus only on the independent set selection strategy.
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3Scenario 1: We consider two possible scenarios (Section II-F). First, we consider the setting when the region
is small consisting of few locations (Section IV). Therefore, the usage statistics and the propagation condition of
a channel do not vary substantially over the region. Thus, we assume that the channel state is identical at each
location in this setting. In the initial stages of deployment of the secondary market, it is expected that the secondary
market will be introduced in small regions consisting of a few locations. Hence, the price competition in this setting
reduces to a price selection problem where the transmission quality of each primary remains the same throughout
the region.
In this setting, we focus on a particular class of graphs, introduced as mean valid graph [5] since most of the small
graphs observed in practice are mean valid graphs (Section IV-B). In a mean valid graph, nodes can be partitioned
in d disjoint maximal independent sets namely I1, . . . , Id [5]. But the total number of independent sets in such a
graph may be substantially large; generally, the number of independent sets grows exponentially with the number of
nodes. We show that there exists a symmetric NE strategy which selects independent sets only amongst I1, . . . , Id
which characterize the mean valid graph (Section IV-E); we explicitly compute the strategy (Section IV-D). Such a
strategy profile can be stored using a d dimensional vector. Thus, the space required to store strategy profile scales
with d rather than increasing exponentially with nodes. Primaries also need to know only I1, . . . , Id rather than the
entire graph in order to compute a symmetric NE.
The characterization of the symmetric NE strategy profile reveals that a primary only selects an independent
set whose cardinality is greater than or equal to a certain threshold (Section IV-D). This threshold turns out to be
a non-decreasing function of channel quality (Section IV-F). Thus, when the channel quality is high, a primary
restricts itself only to independent sets of large cardinalities; when the channel quality is poor, the primary diversifies
among independent sets of different sizes. We show using an example that arises in practice that primaries only
offer their poor quality channels at independent sets of lower cardinalities (Section IV-F). Thus, a social planner
may have to provide some incentives to primaries so as to ensure that users of those locations can get access to
higher quality channels.
Next, we examine the uniqueness among symmetric NE strategy profiles in mean valid graphs (Section IV-G).
Nodes in such a graph can be partitioned into different collections of maximal independent sets (Fig. 7). A primary
in general would not know the partition other primaries are selecting. Our result reveals that each such partition
leads to a unique symmetric NE; yet primaries need not co-ordinate with each other regarding the partition one is
selecting (Theorem 5). Hence the symmetric NE strategy profile is easy to implement. Theorem 5 also reveals that
all these symmetric NEs lead to the same node selection probabilities. The NE pricing strategy at a node depends
only on the probability with which it is selected. Thus, all these symmetric NEs are functionally unique. Finally,
we focus on a special class of mean valid graphs known as linear graphs (Figure 1) which frequently arises in
practice such as in the modeling of communication nodes over a highway or a row of shops. We prove that the
symmetric NE strategy is unique (is not merely functionally unique) in linear graphs (Theorem 6).
Scenario 2: We subsequently consider the scenario when the secondary spectrum market is operated on a large
region consisting of several locations. In this setting the transmission quality of a channel may be different at
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4different locations in the region. Thus, a primary needs to specify a strategy for each possible channel state across
the network (Section V). The number of channel states and thus, the strategy space increases exponentially with
number of nodes. The conflict graph representation of the region depends on the channel state across each location
since a primary must select an independent set of nodes only among those nodes where the channel is available
for sale. A primary is not aware of the conflict graph from which other primaries are selecting their independent
sets let alone their channel states. The characterization of a symmetric NE strategy profile in the above setting is
thus, more challenging. We simplify the model by assuming that the channel is either available or not (i.e. n = 1),
but the availability can differ across the nodes.
We focus on node symmetric or node transitive graphs (Section V-A2) [6] such as finite cyclic graph, infinite
lattice graphs (e.g. infinite linear graph (infinite in both directions), infinite square graph, infinite grid graph, infinite
triangular graphs) [7] which arise in practice when the region becomes large. We allow some statistical correlations
which arise naturally among the channel states at different locations (Section V-A3). We show that there exists
a symmetric NE strategy profile (SPsym ) for those graphs (Theorem 7). In the symmetric NE strategy profile, a
primary randomizes uniformly among the maximum independent sets (the independent set of the highest cardinality).
A primary thus only need to enumerate the maximum independent sets in order to determine SPsym. In contrast to
the setting where the channel state remains the same through the network, in SPsym the channel is offered at every
node with equal probability. We also show that SPsym may not be an NE in a finite linear graph which is not a
node symmetric graph. We show that the symmetric NE may not be unique for a linear graph unlike the setting
where the channel state remains the same throughout the network (Lemma 13).
In SPsym each primary needs to enumerate the maximum independent sets. The number of independent sets
grow exponentially with the nodes. However, at a given channel state vector over the region, the conflict graph may
consist of several components. A primary can find maximum independent sets and SPsym in each component in
parallel. However, the number of maximum independent sets in a component grows exponentially with the number
of nodes in the component. We, thus, investigate the size of the expected component size both analytically and
empirically (Section V-C). Empirical result shows that the average size of components is often moderate and the
upper bound computed analytically is often loose. However, the component size can be substantially large when
the channel availability probability is large. In order to control the component size we, thus, consider the setting
where each primary decides to estimate the channel state at a node with a certain probability (p). A primary then
sells its channel at nodes only amongst the nodes where it estimates the channel. We show that SPsym is a NE
strategy in this setting as well. However, if p is small, then a primary can only sell its channel at few locations
which will potentially reduce the payoff. A primary thus needs to select p judiciously in order to attain a required
trade-off between the computation cost and the expected payoff.
Finally, we numerically compare the expected profit obtained by the primaries using our NE strategy profile
in both of the settings to the maximum possible profit allowing for collusion among primaries (Section VII). The
proofs do not follow from the standard game theory results. The proofs rely on the specific properties of the conflict
graphs, and the game under consideration. Thus, both the results and the proofs are the central contributions of
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C. Related Literature
Price selection in oligopolies has been extensively investigated in economics as a non co-operative Bertrand Game
[8] and its modifications [9], [10]. Price competition among wireless service providers have also been explored to
a great extent [11]–[25]. But all these papers did not consider the uncertainty of competition and the spatial reuse
property of the spectrum oligopoly.
We now distinguish our contributions compared to [5] which is the closest to our work. First, [5] considered
that the channel state remains the same throughout the region and the state of the channel can be either 0 (not
available for sale) or 1 (available); this assumption does not capture the different transmission qualities offered
by the available channels. When we consider that the channel state remains the same throughout the network we
consider that the available channel can be in one of the n states depending on the transmission qualities. Thus,
in our setting a primary now needs to employ different pricing strategies and different independent set selection
strategies for different channel states while in the former case a single pricing and independent set selection strategy
would suffice as the price need not be quoted for an unavailable commodity. Second, we also consider the setting
where the channel state need not be the same unlike in [5]. In our setting a primary does not know the conflict
graph of other primaries from which they will select their independent sets. Thus, the collection of independent
sets from which a primary selects an independent set may be different for different primaries at a given time slot
since the channel state vector may be different for different primaries. Whereas in [5] the channel is either available
at all locations or unavailable at any location. Thus in [5], a primary knows the conflict graph from which other
primaries will select their independent sets when their channels are available. Thus, the characterization of an NE
becomes significantly challenging in our setting compare to [5]. The result we obtain also significantly differs from
[5]. For example, in [5] a primary can select an independent set of lower cardinalities, however, in our setting,
a primary only selects the maximum independent set. Additionally, the symmetric NE is unique in a finite linear
graph in [5], whereas there are infinitely many symmetric NEs in our setting.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Each primary owns a channel over a region. Unless otherwise stated, we consider that there are l number of
primaries and m number of secondaries at each location throughout this paper. We, however, generalize our result
for random apriori unknown m in Section VI. Different channels constitute disjoint frequency bands. Each primary
only allows at most secondary to transmit at a given location.
A. Transmission Rate and Channel State
The channel of a primary provides a certain transmission rate at a location to a secondary who is granted access.
Transmission rate (i.e. Shannon Capacity) at a location depends on– 1) the number of subscribers of a primary that
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6are using the channel at that location1 and 2) the propagation condition of the radio signal [4]. The transmission
rate at a location evolves randomly over time owing to the randomness of the usage of subscribers of primaries and
the propagation condition2. We discretize the transmission rate into a number of states 0, 1, . . . , n. State i provides
a lower transmission rate to a secondary than state j if i < j and state3 0 arises when the secondary can not use
the channel making the channel unavailable for sale.
Let J denote the channel state vector which indicates the channel state at each node. For example, when the
number of nodes are 3, then J = (1, 1, 0) is a channel state vector which indicates that the channel is in state 1,
1, and 0 at nodes 1, 2, and 3 respectively. We assume that the channels are statistically identical, specifically the
probability that the channel state vector of a primary is J is qJ . We also assume that the probability of the event
where the channel state is 0 at every location is non-zero i.e.
qJ > 0 when J = {0, 0, . . . , 0} (1)
B. Penalty functions
Secondaries are passive entities. At a given location they select channels considering the price and the transmission
rate offered by the channel. We assume that the preference of secondaries can be modeled by a penalty function.
If a primary selects a price p at channel state i at a given location, then the channel incurs a penalty gi(p) for
all secondaries at that location. As the name suggests, a secondary prefers a channel with a lower penalty. Since
lower prices should induce lower penalty, thus, we assume that each gi(·) is strictly increasing; therefore, gi(·) is
invertible. For a given price, a channel of higher transmission rate must induce lower penalty, thus, gi(p) < gj(p)
if i > j. No secondary will buy any channel whose penalty exceeds v. Secondaries have the same penalty function
and the same upper bound for penalty value (v), thus, secondaries are statistically identical [3], [4].
We denote fi(·) as the inverse of gi(·). Thus, fi(x) denotes the price when the penalty is x at channel state i.
We assume that gi(·) is continuous, thus fi(·) is continuous and strictly increasing. Also, fi(x) < fj(x) for each
x and i < j.
We focus on penalty functions of the form gi(p) = h1(p)− h2(i), where h1(·) and h2(·) are strictly increasing
in their arguments. Note that −gi(p) may be considered as the utility that a secondary gets at channel state i and
1Shannon Capacity [26] for user i at a channel is equal to log
(
1 +
pihi∑
j 6=i pjhj + σ
2
)
where pk is the transmitted power of user k, σ2
is the power of white noise, hk is the channel gain between transmitter and receiver which depends on the propagation condition. If a secondary
is using the channel then pi, hi of the numerator are the attributes associated with the secondary while pj , hjj 6= i are those of the subscribers
of the primaries. In general, the power pj for subscriber of primaries is constant for subscriber j of primary, but the number of subscribers vary
randomly over time. The power pi with which a secondary will transmit may be a constant or may decrease with the number of subscribers of
primaries in order to limit the interference caused to each subscriber. The above factors contributes to the random fluctuation in the capacity of
a channel offered to a secondary.
2Referring to footnote 1, hk and σ2 evolve randomly owing to the random scattering of the particles in the atmosphere; this phenomenon is
also known as fading [27].
3Generally a minimum transmission rate is required to send data. State 0 indicates that the transmission rate is below that threshold due to
either the excessive usage of subscribers of primaries or the transmission condition.
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7price p. Since utility functions are generally assumed to concave, thus, we consider h1(·) is convex. We show in
[4] that when h1(·) is convex, then penalty functions gi(p) = h1(p)− h2(i) satisfy the following property:
Assumption 1.
fi(y)− c
fj(y)− c <
fi(x)− c
fj(x)− c for all x > y > gi(c), i < j. (2)
Moreover, we also show in [3], [4] that when gi(p) = h1(p)/h2(i), then, the inequality in (2) is satisfied
for some certain convex functions h1(·) like h1(p) = pr(r ≥ 1), exp(p). In addition, there is also a large set
of functions that satisfy (2), such as: gi(p) = ζ (p− h2(i)) , gi(p) = ζ (p/h2(i)) where ζ(·) is continuous and
strictly increasing. Moreover, Assumption 1 is satisfied by penalty functions gi(·) whose inverses are of the form
fi(x) = h(x) + h2(i), fi(x) = h(x) ∗ h2(i), where h(·) is any strictly increasing function. In this setting, we
consider penalty functions which satisfy Assumption 1.
In the special class, when n = 1 i.e. the channel is either available or not, then the available channels offer the
same transmission rates. Hence, we do not need the penalty functions to capture the preference order of secondaries
for available channels having different transmission rates. Thus, the penalty functions are redundant when n = 1.
But to be consistent with the notations, we still use the penalty function g1(·) and the inverse penalty function f1(·)
when n = 1. We do not need Assumption 1 when n = 1 and we only assume that penalty function g1(·) is strictly
increasing.
C. Conflict Graph
Each primary owns a channel over a broad region consisting of several locations. Typically, secondary users
can not transmit simultaneously using the same channel at adjacent locations due to interference. In order to sell
its channel a primary needs to find a set of locations which do not interfere with each other. Wireless networks
have been traditionally modeled as conflict graphs (Figures 1, 2, 3) in most of the existing literature including
in several seminal papers [28]–[30]. Let G = (V,E) be the overall conflict graph of the region where V is the
set of nodes and E is the set of edges; an edge exists between two nodes iff transmission at the corresponding
locations interfere. In a conflict graph, the set of nodes in which no edge exists between any pair of nodes is called
an independent set (Fig. 1, 3). Thus, secondaries at all nodes in an independent set, can transmit simultaneously
using the same channel without any interference.
Note that when the channel of a primary is at state 0 at a node, then the primary can not sell its channel at that
node. Thus, a primary ought to offer its channel at a set of non interfering locations among the locations where
the channel is available for sale (i.e. the state of the channel is not 0). Let GJ = (VJ , EJ) be the conflict graph
representation of the channel state vector J : VJ is the set of nodes (locations) where the channel is available for
sale at channel state vector J of a primary and EJ is the set of edges in G between the nodes of VJ . GJ is obtained
by removing nodes and the edges corresponding to those nodes from G where the channel is not available i.e. the
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Fig. 1: Figure in (a) shows a wireless network with M number of locations. There are m = 2 secondaries at each location.
Signals at locations 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 interfere with each other, but signals at locations 1 and 3 do not interfere. Linear Graph
in figure (b) models the conflict graph of the network in (a). Note that there is an edge between nodes 1 and 2, but not between
nodes 1 and 3. I1 = {1, 3, 5, . . . ,Mo} and I2 = {2, 4, . . . ,Me} constitute independent sets, where Mo (Me, respectively) is
the greatest odd (even, respectively) less than or equal to M . There are other independent sets too e.g. {1,4,6}. Also {1,2,4} is
not an independent set since there is an edge between nodes 1 and 2.
Fig. 2: The rectangle represents a shop in a shopping complex or a department in a university campus. Circles 1, 2, 3, 4 are
the ranges of Wireless access points. Each circle corresponds to a node in the conflict graph. Since ranges of Wireless access
points intersect with each other, thus there exists an edge between every pair of nodes.
channel is at state 0. Thus, GJ is a subgraph of G. Figure 4 represents a conflict graph G of a region and the
conflict graph GJ when the channel state vector is J . A primary needs to select an independent set from GJ when
the channel state vector is J .
D. Strategy and Payoff of Each Primary
Let P denote the set of all possible channel state vectors except when the channel state is 0 across all the
locations. Note that |P| = (n+ 1)|V | − 1.
For each channel state vector J ∈ P a primary selects4: a) an independent set of the conflict graph GJ where
it will sell its channel; b) a price at every node of that independent set. A primary arrives at its decision with the
knowledge of its own channel state vector qJ but without knowing the channel state vector of other primaries.
A primary however knows l,m, n,G, g1, . . . , gn, f1, . . . , fn, and qJ , J ∈ P . Secondaries strictly prefer a channel
which induces lower penalty compared to the higher penalty one as discussed in Section II-B. Since there is a
4A primary does not need to select a strategy when the channel state is 0 at all locations.
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is a grid conflict graph with k rows and columns (here k = 5). Nodes correspond to the Wireless access points. {V1,1, V1,3} is an
independent set and users at these two nodes can transmit simultaneously. But {V1,1, V1,2} or {V1,1, V2,1} are not independent
sets.
Fig. 4: The conflict graph for the overall region is G which corresponds to the situation where the channel is available at all
nodes in the region, GJ is the conflict graph when the channel state vector is J = (j1, j2, j3, 0, 0, 0) where ji ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, 3.
Since the channel states are 0 at nodes 4, 5, and 6, thus, GJ is obtained by removing those nodes and the edges corresponding
to those nodes.
one-to-one correspondence between the price and the penalty at a given channel state, thus, for the ease of analysis
we consider that primaries select penalties instead of prices. The ties among channels with identical penalties are
broken randomly and symmetrically among the primaries. We formulate the decision problem of primaries as a
non-cooperative game with primaries as players.
Definition 1. A strategy of a primary i ψi,J provides the probability mass function (p.m.f) for selection among
the independent sets (I.S.s) and the penalty distribution it uses at each node, when its channel state vector is J .
Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,|P|) denotes the strategy of primary i, and (S1, ..., Sl) denotes the strategy profile of all primaries
(players). S−i denotes the strategy profile of primaries other than i.
Each primary incurs a transition cost c at each location where it is able to sell its channel. If primary i selects
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a penalty x at node s when the channel state is j, then its payoff at node s is5fj(x)− c if the primary sells its channel0 otherwise.
The payoff of a primary over an independent set is the sum of payoff that it gets at each node of that independent
set. Thus, if a primary is unable to sell at any node of an independent set, then its payoff is 0 over that independent
set.
Definition 2. ui,J(ψi,J , S−i) is the expected payoff when primary i’s channel state vector is J and selects strategy
ψi,J(·) and other primaries use strategy S−i.
E. Solution Concept
We seek to obtain a Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy profile which we define below using ui,J (Definition 2),
ψi,J and S−i (Definition 1):
Definition 3. [8] A Nash equilibrium (S1, . . . , Sl) is a strategy profile such that no primary can improve its
expected profit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. So, with Si = (ψi,1, ...., ψi,|P|), (S1, . . . , Sl), is a Nash
equilibrium (NE) if for each primary i and channel state vector J
ui,J(ψi,J , S−i) ≥ ui,J(ψ˜i,J , S−i) ∀ ψ˜i,J . (3)
An NE (S1, . . . , Sl) is a symmetric NE if Si = Sj for all i, j.
If Si 6= Sk for some i, k ∈ {1, . . . , l} in an NE strategy profile, then the strategy profile is an asymmetric NE.
In a symmetric game, as the one we consider, it is difficult to implement an asymmetric NE. For example, if
there are two players and (S1, S2) is an asymmetric NE i.e. S1 6= S2, then (S2, S1) is also an NE due to the
symmetry of the game. The realization of such an NE is only possible when one player knows whether the other
is using S1 or S2. But, apriori coordination among players is infeasible as the game is non co-operative.
Note that if m ≥ l, then primaries select the highest penalty v at each node and will select one of the maximum
independent sets of GJ at channel state vector J with probability 1. This is because, when m ≥ l, then, the channel
of a primary will always be sold at a location. Hence, a primary will be always be able to sell its channel at the
highest possible penalty. Henceforth, we will consider that m < l.
F. Two Different Settings
We consider two different settings: i) First, we consider that the region is small and consists of a few (but,
multiple) locations (Section IV). Initially, it is expected that the secondary market will be introduced in a small
5Note that if Ys is the number of channels offered for sale at a node s, for which the penalties are upper bounded by v, then those with
min(Ys,m) lowest penalties are sold since secondaries select channels in the increasing order of penalties.
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region consisting of few locations. In a small region, the usage statistic and the propagation condition of a channel
will be similar at each location, thus, in an analytical abstraction we consider that the transmission rate offered by
a channel is the same at each location. In this setting, the interference relations amongst the locations may not be
symmetric in general which we accommodate in our model. Since we only consider that the channel state is the
same across the nodes, thus, qJ = 0 for all those channel state vectors where the channel state is not identical at
each location.
ii) Second, we consider the region consists of large number of locations (Section V). This is likely to happen in
later stages of deployment of the secondary market. Since the geographical region is large, the transmission rate
offered by a channel at different locations may be different. Thus, we consider that the channel state of a primary
can be different at different locations. Given the large region, there will be an inherent symmetry in the interference
relations among the locations which we characterize and exploit.
III. INITIAL RESULTS, MULTIPLE NES, AND A SEPARATION RESULT
A. Results Of One-shot Single Location Game
Now, we briefly summarize the main results of the game when it is limited to only one location, which we have
studied in [3], [4]. Since there is only node, thus, the channel state vector reduces to a scalar and we denote qj
when the channel is in state j ∈ {0, . . . , n} at that node. Note that there is no spatial reuse constraint in this setting,
thus a primary’s decision is only to select a penalty.
We start with following definitions. Let w(x) be the probability of at least m successes out of l− 1 independent
Bernoulli trials, each of which occurs with probability x. Thus,
w(x) =
l−1∑
i=m
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−i−1. (4)
Note that w(·) is continuous and strictly increasing in [0, 1], so its inverse exists.
Now, let for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
L0 = U1 = v,
pj − c = (fj(Uj)− c)(1− w(
n∑
k=j
qk)) (5)
and Lj = gj(
pj − c
1− w(∑nk=j+1 qk) + c), Uj = Lj−1 (6)
Since U1 = v, thus we obtain pj , Lj (which in turn gives Uj+1) recursively starting from j = 1 using (5) and (6).
Note that v > L1 > . . . > Ln and fj(Lj) > c [3]. We have shown
Lemma 1. [3], [4] A NE strategy profile (φ1(·), . . . , φn(·)) must comprise of:
φj(x) =0, if x < Lj
1
qj
(w−1(
fj(x)− pj
fj(x)− c )−
n∑
k=j+1
qk), if Lj−1 ≥ x ≥ Lj
1, if x > Lj−1. (7)
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Fig. 5: Figure in the left hand side shows the d.f. ψi(·), i = 1, . . . , 3 as a function of penalty for an example setting:
v = 100, c = 1, l = 21,m = 10, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2 and gi(x) = x− i3. Note that support sets of ψi(·)s are disjoint
with L3 = 17.2766, U3 = 17.345 = L2, U2 = 22.864 = L1, and U1 = 100 = v. Figures in the center and the right hand side
show d.f. ψ2(·) and ψ3(·) respectively, using different scales compared to the left hand figure.
At channel state j a primary selects a penalty using φj(·). Note that φj(·) not only depends on qj , j > 1 but
also depends on qi, i ≤ j. The support of φj(·) is the closed interval [Lj , Lj−1] j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Lj−1 or Uj is the
upper endpoint of the support of φj(·). φj(·) is strictly increasing from Lj to Uj and there is no “gap” between
the support sets of φj(·), j = 1, . . . , n [3]. Fig. 5 illustrates Ljs and Ujs in an example scenario. Since a secondary
always prefers a channel of the lower quality thus, Lemma 1 entails that primaries select prices to render the channel
of the highest quality as more preferable to the secondaries at a location.
Theorem 1. [3], [4] The strategy profile, in which each primary randomizes over the penalties in the range
[Lj , Lj−1] using the continuous distribution function φj(·) (Lemma 1) when the channel state is j, is the unique
NE strategy profile. The expected payoff that a primary attains at every penalty within the interval [Lj , Lj−1] is
pj − c at channel state j.
B. Multiple Asymmetric NEs
We first show that there can be multiple NEs in this game unlike in the single location game. Consider the linear
conflict graph (Fig. 1) with 2 nodes, 2 primaries and 1 secondary.
We show multiple asymmetric NEs for two different settings which we have discussed in Section II-F. First,
we consider the setting where the channel state is the same across the network. Thus, a primary needs to select a
strategy when the channel state is not 0 across the network. Note that if primaries selects different nodes, then each
primary can attain a maximum profit of (fi(v) − c) at the channel state i which corresponds to selecting penalty
v. Thus, both the following strategy profiles are asymmetric NE: 1) primary 1 (2, respectively) selects V1 (V2,
respectively) w.p. 1 and selects penalty v irrespective of the channel state; 2) primary 1 (2, respectively) selects
V2 (V1, respectively) w.p. 1 and selects penalty v w.p. 1 irrespective of the channel state across the network. The
realization of one of the above NEs is possible only when a primary knows other’s strategy apriori; this is ruled
out due to non-cooperation. Thus, asymmetric NE can not be realized in this game.
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Now, we will provide multiple asymmetric NE strategies for the above linear conflict graph when the channel state
can be different at different locations using the NE penalty strategy for single location as presented in Section III-A.
We need to specify strategy at each possible channel state vector. We consider n = 1 i.e. at any given node the
channel is either available (state 1) or not (state 0). We also consider that the channel state of a primary is 1 at a
given location w.p. q1 independent of the channel state at other location. The following strategy profiles are NE
strategy profiles: i) When the channel state vector is (0, 1) ((1, 0) respv.) then a primary selects node 2 (1 respv.)
w.p. 1 and selects the single location penalty strategy stated in Theorem 1 with q1q0 in place of q16. When the
channel state vector is (1, 1) then primary 1 (primary 2 respv.) selects node 1 (node 2 respv.) w.p. 1 and selects
penalty v w.p. 1.
ii) When the channel state vector is either (0, 1) or (1, 0) then the strategy profile is the same as before. When
channel state vector is (1, 1) then primary 1 (primary 2 respv.) selects node 2 (node 1 respv.) w.p. 1 and selects
penalty v w.p. 1.
Note that NE strategy profiles cited above are asymmetric. The game is a symmetric one since primaries have
the same action sets, payoff functions and their channels are statistically identical. In a symmetric game, we have
already discussed in Section II-D that implementing an asymmetric NE is difficult. We therefore focus on finding
a symmetric NE and investigate whether it is unique. Clearly, for any symmetric NE, we can represent the strategy
of any primary as S = (ψ1(.), ψ2(.), ....., ψ|P|(.)) where we drop the index corresponding to the primary.
C. A Separation Result
We now observe that the NE penalty selection at a node in an independent set can be uniquely computed using
the single location NE penalty selection strategy stated in Section III-A once the independent set selection strategy
is known.
Lemma 2. Suppose, under a symmetric NE, each primary offers its channel which is at state j at node a for sale
at node a w.p. αa,j . Then, the unique NE penalty distribution of each primary is the d.f. φj(·) as described in
Lemma 1 with αa,j in place of qj at node a.
We next obtain the expression for αa,j . We first introduce some notations: Let IJ be the set of independent sets
of the graph GJ . Let Pa,j be the set of channel state vectors where the channel state is j at node a.
Definition 4. Let βJ(I) be the probability with which the independent set I ∈ IJ is selected by a primary, under
a symmetric NE strategy when the channel state vector is J .
Note that though βJ(I) depends on the symmetric NE strategy, we do not make it explicit in the notation in
6q1q0 is the probability that the channel state vector is either (0, 1) or (1, 0).
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order to keep the notational simplicity. Thus,
αa,j =
∑
I∈IJ :a∈I
∑
J:J∈Pa,j
qJβJ(I) (8)
Since the penalty selection strategy of a primary is unique given the independent set selection strategy {βJ(I)}
(by Lemma 2), henceforth, we only focus on independent set selection probability which provides the node selection
probability as defined in (8).
IV. SAME CHANNEL STATE ACROSS THE REGION
We first consider the setting where the channel state is the same across the network. Recall from Section II-F that
this setting occurs when the region is of moderate size. We first introduce some notations specific to this setting
(Section IV-A). We focus on symmetric NEs on a specific class of conflict graphs known as mean valid graph since
conflict graphs of most of the commonly observed wireless networks of moderate sizes belong to this category
(Section IV-B). We subsequently focus on a policy which provides a storage and computation efficient NE strategy
(if it exists) (Section IV-C). We identify certain key properties that any NE strategy profile of the above policy
(should it exist) must satisfy (Section IV-D). Then, we show that the identified structure is a unique and there
exists a strategy profile which satisfies the identified structure (Theorem 3). We show that the strategy profile which
satisfies the identified structure is an NE (Theorem 4). Finally, we investigate the uniqueness and implementation
issues of the symmetric NE profile (Section IV-G).
A. Modifications of Notations
Since the channel state is the same across the region, we denote the channel state vector J as the scalar j in this
setting when the channel state is j at each location. For example, if the channel state is 3 everywhere, we denote
the channel state at the network as 3. qJ = 0 for all J where the channel state is not identical at each location and
we denote the probability that the channel state is j over the region as qj with slight abuse of notation. Note that
in this setting, when the channel state is j ≥ 1, then the channel is available at each node, hence, a primary always
selects an independent set from the conflict graph G when the channel is available.
We replace βJ(I) in Definition 4 with βj(I) which denotes the probability with which a primary selects
independent set I under a symmetric NE strategy. Note that Pa,j is now simply j. αa,j is thus,
αa,j =
∑
I:a∈I
qjβj(I) (9)
Also note from (1) that the channel state is 0 over the network with some non zero probability i.e.
n∑
j=1
qj < 1 (10)
The cardinality of the strategy space P in this setting is n. The NE strategy profile is thus represented as
(ψ1(·), . . . , ψn(·)) in this setting. Note that though the state of a channel is the same across the nodes, the propagation
condition and the usage level of different channels can be different, thus, a primary is still not aware of the states
of the channel of other primaries.
November 21, 2018 DRAFT
15
B. Mean Valid Graphs
In practice most of the finite size wireless networks are of the following types:
• Wireless network of roadside shops.
• Wireless network of buildings.
• Cellular networks with hexagonal or square cells.
Conflict graphs of all the above wireless networks belong to a category, introduced as mean valid graphs [5].
Definition 5. [5] A graph G = (V,E) is said to be a mean valid graph if and only if
1) Its vertex set can be partitioned into d disjoint maximal7 I.S. for some integer d ≥ 2 : V = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ . . .∪ Id8
where Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, is a maximal independent set and Is ∩ Ir = ∅, s 6= r. Let, |Is| = Ms,
M1 ≥M2 ≥ . . . ≥Md. (11)
and Is = {as,k : k = 1, . . . ,Ms}.
2) Suppose I ∈ Icontains ms(I) nodes from Is, s = 1, . . . , d, then ,
d∑
s=1
ms(I)
Ms
≤ 1 ∀I ∈ I. (12)
I1, . . . , Id are said to characterize the mean valid graph. The following graphs are mean valid graphs [5].
• Linear Graph constitutes a conflict graph for locations along a highway or a row of shops (Fig. 1). It is a
mean valid graph with d = 2.
• Grid Graph constitutes a conflict graph for a building (Fig. 3) or cellular network with square cells. It is a
mean valid graph with d = 4. Three dimensional grid graph is also a mean valid graph with d = 8.
• Conflict graph of a cellular network with hexagonal cells is also a mean valid graph with d = 3, if it has an
even number of rows and all rows have the same number of nodes which should be a multiple of 3.
Henceforth, we focus on mean valid graphs in this setting.
C. A storage & Computation efficient policy
As in any graph, in mean valid graphs, the number of independent sets grows exponentially with the number
of nodes. We have to compute probability distribution over all independent sets in order to find an independent
set selection strategy. Thus, computation and storage requirements grow exponentially as the number of nodes
increases. However, mean valid graphs are characterized by maximal independent sets I1, . . . , Id which partition
7An independent set I is said to be maximal if for each a /∈ I, a ∈ V , I ∪ {a} is not an independent set [2].
8For example, linear conflict graph (Fig. 1) is mean valid graph with d = 2, with I1 being the set of odd numbered nodes and
I2 being the set of even numbered nodes. In Fig. 3 d = 4, with I1 = {V1,1, V1,3, . . . , V1,ko , V3,1, V3,3, . . . , V3,ko , . . .}, I2 =
{V1,2, V1,4, . . . , V1,ke , V3,2, V3,4, . . . , V3,ke , . . .}, I3 = {V2,1, V2,3, . . . , V2,ko , V4,1, V4,3, . . . , V4,ko , . . .}, I4 =
{V2,2, V2,4, . . . , V2,ke , V4,2, V4,4, . . . , V4,ke , . . .}, where ko (respectively, ke) denote the greatest odd (respectively, even) integer less
than or equal to k.
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the set of nodes. So, if there exists an NE strategy profile which only selects independent sets amongst I1, . . . , Id,
then we only need to store d independent sets and the corresponding probability distribution. Thus, the storage and
computation requirement only scales with d and does not increase exponentially with the number of nodes. We
therefore examine if there exists an NE strategy profile under which
• Each primary selects only independent sets in {I1, . . . , Id}. Specifically, at channel state j, independent set
Ik, k ∈ {1, . . . , d} is selected with probability tk,j .
Under the policy, thus,
βj(Ik) = tk,j ∀k ∈ {1, . . . d} such that
d∑
k=1
βj(Ik) = 1. (13)
Thus, from (9) and (13) for any two nodes s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
αs,j = αr,j = qjtk,j
d∑
k=1
tk,j = 1. (14)
In the next section, we show that there exists a unique symmetric NE strategy which satisfies (14).
D. Characterization of Symmetric NE
We first, characterize the properties that any symmetric NE strategy profile of the form (14) must satisfy.
By virtue of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we know the penalty selection strategy for each state at a given node for a
given NE independent set selection strategy. The support sets of penalty distributions are contiguous (Section III-A).
However, the end-points of the support sets are not necessarily the same across the location. Surprisingly, we show
that the upper endpoints of the penalty selection strategy at a particular channel state i, i = 1, . . . , n are identical
across different locations regardless of the choice of independent sets (Lemma 3). We show that there exists a
threshold such that only those independent sets, whose cardinalities are equal to or greater than that threshold, are
selected with positive probabilities (Lemma 4). Drawing from the above lemmas we characterize the structure that
any NE strategy profile of the form (14) (if it exists) has to satisfy (Theorem 2). The proofs of the results have
been provided at the end of this subsection.
We start with some notations which we use throughout.
Definition 6. Let,
W (x) = 1− w(x). (15)
Since w(·) is continuous and strictly increasing (by (4)),thus, W (·) is a continuous and a strictly decreasing
function with W (0) = 1.
Definition 7. Let γs,j denote the probability that a channel of state j or higher is offered at a node of Is. Thus,
γs,j =
n∑
k=j
ts,kqk =
n∑
k=j
αa,k. (16)
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From (16), we obtain a recursive method to calculate γs,j .
γs,j−1 =
n∑
k=j−1
ts,kqk = ts,j−1qj−1 + γs,j . (17)
In the class of policies of the form (14), αa,j is equal to qjts,j for every node a in independent set Is, s ∈
{1, . . . , d}. Thus, by Lemma 2 the penalty selection strategy at any node of Is is given by Lemma 1 with qjts,j
in place of qj . Thus, by (5), (6), and Theorem 1, expected payoff obtained by a primary at every node of Is at
channel state j is–
ps,j − c = (fj(Us,j)− c)(1− w(
n∑
i=j
ts,iqi))
= (fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) (18)
where
Us,j = gj(
ps,j − c
W (γs,j)
+ c) Us,1 = v, Us,j = Ls,j−1 (19)
Ls,j = gj(
ps,j − c
W (γs,j+1)
+ c) Ls,0 = v. (20)
Remark 1. Starting from Us,1 = v, we can find ps,1 using (18) which we use to find Ls,1 (from (20)). Since
Ls,1 = Us,2, thus utilizing Us,2 we obtain ps,2 (from (18)) which in turn gives Ls,2 (from (20)). Thus, recursively
we obtain Us,j , ps,j , Ls,j for all s ∈ {1, . . . , d} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, we can easily compute a penalty
selection strategy at each node of Is for a given ts,j .
Remark 2. Note from Lemmas 1 and 2 that each primary selects penalty only from the interval [Ls,j , Us,j ] at
channel state j at every node of Is when ts,j > 0.
Since ps,j − c is the expected payoff that a primary gets at any node in Is at channel state j when primaries
select Is with probability ts,j > 0, thus, the expected payoff to a primary at channel state j over independent set
Is when ts,j > 0 is
Ms(ps,j − c) = Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) (from(18)). (21)
Now, we introduce some notations that we use throughout.
Definition 8. Let Pj(Ik) denote the maximum expected payoff that a primary can get at independent set Ik at
channel state j when other primaries select a symmetric NE strategy profile which is of the form (14) . Let P ∗j be
the maximum among Pj(Ir) r ∈ {1, . . . , d} i.e.
P ∗j = max
r∈{1,...,d}
Pj(Ir).
Let Bj denote the set of indices out of I1, . . . , Id which are selected with positive probability under a symmetric
NE strategy profile at channel state j.
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At channel state j an independent set is selected with positive probability in an NE strategy profile only if the
expected payoff at that independent set is9 P ∗j ; hence when the channel state is j, then
Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j if s ∈ Bj(from(21)). (22)
Now, we are ready to state the results.
Lemma 3. If ts,j > 0, tr,j > 0, then Us,j = Ur,j .
The above lemma shows that upper end points of penalty selection strategy is the same across the nodes of the
independent sets which are chosen with positive probability.10
Remark 3. From lemma 3 we can write Us,j as Uj ∀s ∈ Bj . So, for any s, r ∈ Bj , we must have from (22)
Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j) = P ∗j .
MsW (γs,j) = MrW (γr,j). (23)
Next lemma characterizes the best response set Bj .
Lemma 4. There exists an integer dj ∈ {1, . . . , d}, such that I1, . . . , Idj are selected with positive probability and
Idj+1, . . . , Id are selected with zero probability at channel state j.
Thus, from (11), only those independent sets whose cardinalities are greater than or equal to Mdj are selected with
positive probabilities at channels state j . We show in Lemma 8 that this above threshold Mdj is a non-decreasing
function in channel state j.
In an NE strategy only those independent sets are selected with positive probabilities which give an expected
payoff of P ∗j , thus we can evaluate the expected payoff under the NE strategy using Lemma 4. Since we know
from Lemma 4 that NE strategy profile only selects those independent sets whose indices are less than or equal to
dj , thus, under NE strategy expected payoff of a primary at channel state j is given by
P ∗j = Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) s ≤ dj . (24)
We will also show that P ∗j ≥Mr(fj(Uj)−c)W (γr,j) for r > dj to prove Lemma 4 (Lemma 7 in Section IV-D2).
Drawing from the above it readily follows that
9Consider that in an NE strategy profile Is is selected w.p. ts,j > 0, but expected payoff is strictly less than P ∗j which it obtains at Ir (say).
Let in the NE strategy profile Ir is selected w.p. tr,j . Note that the expected payoff of a primary at an independent set only depends on the
strategy of other primaries. Thus, a primary can unilaterally deviate by selecting Ir w.p. ts,j + tr,j and Is w.p. 0; but under the new strategy
profile its expected payoff is strictly higher. Hence, the original strategy profile can not be an NE.
10Note that we have not shown any relation between Ls,j and Lr,j . Thus, even though Us,j = Ur,j , it is possible that Ls,j 6= Lr,j . But if
ts,j+1 > 0, tr,j+1 > 0, then from Lemma 3 we obtain Us,j+1 = Ur,j+1; since Ls,j = Us,j+1, Lr,j = Ur,j+1, thus we have Ls,j = Lr,j .
Hence, lower endpoint of penalty selection strategy at every node of independent sets Is, Ir is also the same if both Is, Ir are selected with
positive probabilities for both the states j and j + 1.
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Fig. 6: This figure shows tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) at channel state j = 1, 2, 3 for Example 1.
Theorem 2. The structure of a symmetric NE strategy profile which satisfies (14) (if it exists), is of the following
form ∀a ∈ Is for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
αa,j = qjts,j ,
d∑
s=1
ts,j = 1, ts,j > 0, s ≤ dj , ts,j = 0, s > dj (25)
such that
M1W (γ1,j) = . . . = MdjW (γdj ,j) ≥Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j) ≥Mdj+2W (γdj+2,j) ≥ . . . ≥MdW (γd,j). (26)
Note that the number of equations increases linearly with the number of states n.
Theorem 2 provides an iterative way to compute ts,j for all s, j. Noting that γs,n = ts,nqn, (26) has only one
variable ts,n at j = n for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Thus, we first compute ts,n for all s using (25) and (26) for j = n. From
(17), γs,n−1 depends on γs,n and ts,j−1. Since we have already computed ts,n or γs,n, thus we solve for ts,n−1
from (25) and (26). Thus, recursively we obtain ts,j for all s and j. A primary only needs to know I1, . . . , Id to
compute the independent set selection strategy and does not need to know the information regarding the network
(e.g. edges).
Example 1. We consider a grid graph with d = 4 and k = 5 (Fig. 3) . Here, M1 = 9,M2 = M3 = 6,M4 = 4.
We consider l = 20,m = 6, n = 3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2. We first calculate ts,3 for all s. We obtain M1W (γ1,3) =
7.5324, M2W (γ2,3) = 6,M3W (γ3,3) = 6, M4W (γ4,3) = 4. Thus, d3 = 1 and the solution of (25) and (26)
is: t3 = (1, 0, 0, 0), where tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) for j = 1, . . . , 3. Next, we compute ts,2 following the recursive
algorithm we stated. We obtain d2 = 3 and t2 = (0.2532, 0.3734, 0.3734, 0). Finally, we calculate ts,1. We obtain
d1 = 3 and t1 = (0.071, 0.4645, 0.4645, 0) Fig. 6 shows plots of ts,j for all s and j.
1) Proof of Lemma 3: We first deduce some results which we use throughout.
Since γs,j ≤
∑n
i=1 qi < 1, thus ps,j − c > 0. Hence,
fj(Us,j) > c, fj(Ls,j) > c. (27)
Now, we provide the expression for expected payoff that a primary attains at Ls,i i = 1, . . . , n at any node in Is
at channel state j. Note that players with channel state higher than i select a penalty lower than or equal to Ls,i
with probability 1 and players with channel state lower than or equal to i select a penalty lower than or equal to
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Ls,i with probability 0 at every node of Is. Thus, the expected payoff to a primary when it selects penalty Ls,i at
channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n} at any node of Is is
(fj(Ls,i)− c)W (
n∑
k=i+1
qkts,k) = (fj(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1). (28)
Now, we state and prove Observations 1 and 2 which we use throughout.
Observation 1. γs,k = γs,k1 +
∑k1−1
i=k ts,iqi for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, n ≥ k1 > k.
The observation readily follows from (16). Since from (16)
γs,k =
k1−1∑
i=k
ts,iqi +
n∑
i=k1
ts,iqi =
k1−1∑
i=k
ts,iqi + γs,k1 .
Observation 2. Us,j = Ls,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} if and only if (iff) ts,j = 0. Us,j = Ls,k iff ts,i = 0 ∀k < i < j.
Hence, Us,j = v iff ts,k = 0 ∀k < j.
Proof: Ls,j = Us,j implies from (19) and (20) that γs,j+1 = γs,j ; thus by Observation 1 we have ts,j = 0.
On the other hand if ts,j = 0 then by Observation 1 γs,j = γs,j+1. Thus, it follows that Us,j = Ls,j iff ts, j = 0.
Since Ls,k = Us,k+1, hence Us,j = Ls,k iff ts,i = 0 ∀k < i < j. Hence, Us,j = Ls,1 = Us,1 iff ts,i = 0 ∀i < j.
On the other hand by (19) Us,1 = v. Thus, the result follows.
Now we are ready to show Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Since both s, r ∈ Bj , hence from (22)
Ms(fj(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = Mr(fj(Ur,j)− c)W (γr,j) = P ∗j .
(29)
Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. Us,j 6= Ur,j when s, r ∈ Bj . Without loss of generality, we can assume that
Us,j > Ur,j . So, Ur,j < v. Thus, by Observation 2, there exists k such that tr,k > 0, k < j and Lr,k = Ur,j . Thus,
from (22)
P ∗k = Mr(fk(Ur,k)− c)W (γr,k)
= Mr(fk(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1)(from (19)&(20)). (30)
If a primary selects penalty Us,j(= Ls,j−1) at a node of Is when its channel state is k, then from (28) its expected
payoff would be
(fk(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = (fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c)
P ∗j
Ms
(from (29)).
Thus a primary obtains an expected payoff of at least
Ms(fk(Us,j)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j
(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c) .
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at independent set Is at channel state k. By definition of P ∗k ,
P ∗j
(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fj(Us,j)− c) ≤ P
∗
k . (31)
Since Ur,j = Lr,k and thus fk(Ur,j) > c (by (27)). Thus expected payoff at Ir at channel state j is at least
Mr(fj(Ur,j)− c)W (γr,k+1) which is
=
(fj(Ur,j)− c)
fk(Ur,j)− c P
∗
k (from (30))
≥ P ∗j
(fj(Ur,j)− c)(fk(Us,j)− c)
(fk(Ur,j)− c)(fj(Us,j)− c) (from (31))
> P ∗j (from (2), j > k, Us,j > Ur,j)
which is not possible by Definition 8.
2) Proof of Lemma 4: We state and prove Lemmas 5, 6, and 7 which we use to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Ls,k ≥ Uj if s ∈ Bk, s /∈ Bj , k < j, j ≥ 2.
Remark 4. Note that if s ∈ Bk ∩ Bj and k < j, then from (19), Ls,k ≥ Uj . But, it is not apriori clear the
relationship between Ls,k and Uj when s ∈ Bk but s /∈ Bj for k < j. The above lemma provides the answer.
Since s ∈ Bk , thus expected payoff obtained at Is at channel state k is P ∗k (by (22)). If Uj > Ls,k for some
k < j and s /∈ Bj , then it can be shown that by selecting independent set Ir (where r ∈ Bj) a primary can attain a
strictly higher payoff compared to P ∗k at channel state k which is not possible by Definition 8. The argument will
be similar to the proof of Lemma 3. Thus, we omit it.
It is not clear that P ∗j ≥Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j) if r /∈ Bj . Since r /∈ Bj , thus, a primary will not employ any
penalty selection strategy at any node of Ir when the channel state is j. Thus, at any given node in Ir, the expected
payoff at Uj is still unknown. The following lemma provides the answer.
Lemma 6. If r /∈ Bj , then P ∗j ≥Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j).
Proof: Since r /∈ Bj , hence we must have tr,j = 0. Suppose the statement is false, then for some r /∈ Bj , we
must have
P ∗j < Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j). (32)
Now we show that a primary will attain an expected payoff which is strictly higher than P ∗j at channel state j at
independent set Ir.
Let, k = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : r ∈ Bi}, if r /∈ Bi,∀i < j, then set k = 0. By definition of k, tr,i = 0
∀k < i < j. Thus by Observation 1, γr,k+1 = γr,j . Thus, from (28) the expected payoff at Lr,k (if k = 0, then
Lr,0 = v) at channel state j is
(fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) = (fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,j). (33)
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Now from Lemma 5 Lr,k ≥ Uj when k > 0. If k = 0, then Lr,k = v by Observation 2. Thus, Lr,k ≥ Uj ∀k.
Hence, from (33) total expected payoff at Ir is at least
Mr(fj(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,j) ≥Mr(fj(Uj)− c)W (γr,j)
> P ∗j (from (32) (34)
which contradicts P ∗j from Definition 8.
Thus, if s, s1 ∈ Bj and s2 /∈ Bj , then we have
P ∗j = Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = Ms1(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs1,j) ≥Ms2(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs2,j) (from Lemma 6)
MsW (γs,j) = Ms1W (γs1,j) ≥Ms2W (γs2,j). (35)
We now state and prove Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. MrW (γr,j) ≥MsW (γs,j) if r < s for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof: Suppose the statement is false i.e. MrW (γr,j) < MsW (γs,j) for some r < s and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since Mr ≥ Ms (by (11)), thus there must exist a k ∈ {j, . . . , n} such that MrW (γr,k+1) ≥ MsW (γs,k+1) but
MrW (γr,k) < MsW (γs,k) with γr,n+1 = γs,n+1 = 0.
Since γs1,k ≥ γs1,k+1 (by Observation 1) ∀s1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and W (·) is strictly decreasing function, thus, we
have
MrW (γr,k) < MsW (γs,k)
≤MsW (γs,k+1) ≤MrW (γr,k+1). (36)
Since W (·) is strictly decreasing function and γr,k = tr,kqk + γr,k+1 (from Observation 1), thus tr,k > 0 from
(36); which implies that r ∈ Bk. But this contradicts (35). Hence, the result follows.
Now, we are ready to show Lemma 4.
proof of Lemma 4: Suppose that r < s, but r /∈ Bk, s ∈ Bk for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note from Observation 1 that
γs,k > γs,k+1 since ts,k > 0. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing thus W (γs,k) < W (γs,k+1). On the other hand, since
r /∈ Bk, thus tr,k = 0. Thus, from Observation 1 γr,k+1 = γr,k and therefore, we obtain W (γr,k+1) = W (γr,k).
Thus we obtain from Lemma 7–
MrW (γr,k) = MrW (γr,k+1) ≥MsW (γs,k+1) > MsW (γs,k).
But s ∈ Bk, r /∈ Bk, thus the above inequality contradicts (35).
E. Existence
Theorem 2 characterizes the structure of independent set selection strategy which is of the form (14). We have
not yet shown whether there exists such a distribution and whether such a distribution is unique. We resolve both
the issues in the following theorem which we have proved in Appendix A:
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Theorem 3. There exists a unique probability distribution tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j), j = 1, . . . , n which satisfies (25) &
(26).
We now show that independent set selection strategy profile described in (25) and (26) is an NE.
Theorem 4. At channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, consider the following strategy profile. The unique independent set
selection strategy profile is given by (25) and (26) and at every node of Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, penalty selection strategy
is ψj(·) with qjts,j in place of qj as described in Lemma 1. Such a strategy profile constitutes an NE in the class
of mean valid graphs.
Thus, there exists a symmetric NE which selects an independent set among I1, . . . , Id. Such a selection strategy
is storage and computationally efficient as explained in the first paragraph of Section IV-C. By virtue of Theorem 2
we also know how to compute the probabilities of these independent sets by solving n equations.
1) Outline of Proof of Theorem 4: We first show that a primary at channel state j attains an expected payoff of
P ∗j at each independent set Is, s ≤ dj . Subsequently, we show that at any independent set Is, s > dj , the maximum
attainable payoff of a primary at channel state j is less than P ∗j when other primaries select strategies according to
(25) and (26). Finally, we show that if a primary selects an independent set which does not belong to the partition,
then, its maximum expected payoff is also less than P ∗j . Thus, it shows that a primary attains maximum expected
payoff only at independent sets Is, s ≤ dj , hence, a primary does not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally
from the strategy profile which proves the theorem. The detail of the proof is given in Appendix B.
F. Properties of Threshold
Recall from Lemma 4 and Theorem 2 that a primary only selects those independent sets which have cardinalities
greater than or equal to Mdj with positive probabilities at channel state j. In this section, we discuss some important
properties of dj , j = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 8. Threshold is a non-decreasing function of transmission rate i.e. dj ≥ dj+1
From (11) and Lemma 8 we have Mdj ≤ Mdj+1 . From Example 1, we obtain d3 < d2 = d1 which validates
the above lemma. In Example 1 only I1 is selected when the channel state is the highest i.e. 3. Thus, a primary
never selects I2, I3 and I4 when its channel has the highest transmission rate.
This tells that in practice, secondary users in some locations can never get access to a channel of higher quality.
In Example 1, users in the locations belonging to independent sets I2, I3 and I4 will never get access to the highest
quality channel. To avoid such socially unacceptable situation a social planner may have to provide some incentives
to primaries so that they offer their high quality channels in independent sets of lower cardinalities. Designing such
an incentive constitutes an important problem for future research.
Since ts,j > 0 for s ≤ dj the following result is immediate from Lemma 8.
Corollary 1. ts,k > 0 implies that ts,j > 0 where j < k; t1,j > 0 ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
November 21, 2018 DRAFT
24
Thus, independent set I1 is always selected with positive probability at every channel state (Fig. 6). Corollary 1
implies that if a given primary offers its channel at an independent set Is, s ∈ {1, . . . , d} with positive probability
when the channel provides higher transmission rate, then the primary also offers its channel at Is with positive
probability when its channel provides lower transmission rate. But note that the converse is not always true.
1) Proof of Lemma 8: Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. dj < dj+1 for some j.
From (26) we obtain for state j + 1
M1W (γ1,j+1) = MdjW (γdj ,j+1) = Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j+1). (37)
Since tdj ,j > 0 thus γdj ,j > γdj ,j+1 by Observation 1. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing, thus we have
W (γdj ,j) < W (γdj ,j+1). (38)
Since dj < dj+1, thus tdj+1,j = 0. Thus, from Observation 1, γdj+1,j+1 = γdj+1,j . Thus from (37) and (38), we
obtain
MdjW (γdj ,j) < Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j+1)
= Mdj+1W (γdj+1,j). (39)
Since dj < dj+1 thus (39) contradicts (26).
G. Uniqueness of Symmetric NE & Implementation Issues
Till now we have shown that when primaries select among maximal independent sets characterizing the mean
valid graphs, then there exists a unique symmetric NE (Theorems 3 and 4). Figure 7 reveals that partition of nodes
amongst maximal independent sets need not be unique. We have shown that each such partition leads to a unique
symmetric NE (Theorems 3 and 4). Thus, symmetric NE is not unique.
A primary would not know the partitions other primaries are selecting since the co-ordination among the primaries
is infeasible in a non co-operative game. Theorem 5 entails that co-ordination among the players is not required
when the independent set selection strategy is of the form (25) and (26). We obtain an even stronger result in a
special case: we show that there is a unique symmetric NE in a linear conflict graph (Theorem 6).
Theorem 5. Consider that nodes in a mean valid graph can be partitioned into two different sets of maximal
independent sets: i) I1, . . . , Id, and ii) I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯. Suppose at channel state j = 1, . . . , n, 0 ≤ nj ≤ l number of
primaries select independent sets among I1, . . . , Id and l− nj number of primaries select independent sets among
I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ according to (25) and (26). Then the strategy profile constitutes an NE.
Additionally, let αa,j (α¯a,j respv.) be the probability with which primary i offers its channel at node a at channel
state j when it selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id (I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ reps.) such that (25) and (26) are satisfied,
then αa,j = α¯a,j .
The first part of the above theorem implies that regardless of the partition other primaries select, a primary can
attain its NE strategy profile by selecting independent sets using one of the partition. Hence, a primary needs not
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Fig. 7: The above mean valid graph has two different sets of partitions: 1) I1 = {1, 3, 5}, I2 = {2, 4, 6} and 2) I¯1 =
{1, 3, 6}, I¯2 = {2, 4, 5}. If αa,j (α¯a,j , respectively) is the node selection probability at node a under NE strategy profile where
primaries select I1, I2 (I¯1, I¯2, respectively), then according to Theorem 5, we obtain αa,j = α¯a,j for all channel states j. There
exists independent sets which are different from I1, I2 and I¯1, I¯2 e.g. {1, 3}, {2, 4}.
co-ordinate with other primaries in order to decide which partition it will choose. Thus, the strategy profile of the
form (25) and (26) is easy to implement.
The second part of the theorem implies that regardless of the partition primary i selects, the node selection
probability will be identical. Thus, the independent set selection strategies are functionally unique. Note that when
different primaries select independent set selection strategies using different partitions, then the strategy profile is
not symmetric, however, the node selection probabilities will be identical.
In Theorem 5 we show that when primaries select independent sets which belong to a partition, then the symmetric
NE will lead to the same node selection probability. But there are independent sets which do not belong to a partition
characterizing the mean valid graph (Fig. 7). We have not ruled out a symmetric NE which selects an independent
set which is outside of a partition characterizing the mean valid graph. We rule this out in the special class of
linear conflict graphs. Linear conflict graphs frequently arise in practice: e.g. in the modeling of wireless access
point across a highway or along a row of shops.
We show11 in Appendix D–
Theorem 6. There exists a unique (not merely functionally unique) symmetric NE strategy profile in a linear conflict
graph. In the symmetric NE each primary selects only independent sets I1 and I2, where I1 (I2, respectively) consists
of odd (even, respectively) numbered nodes (Fig. 1).
1) Proof of Theorem 5: First, we provide an outline of the proof.
Suppose both the partitions 1) I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ and 2) I1, . . . , Id characterize a mean valid graph G (i.e. they satisfy
conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 5). Let |I¯s| = M¯s for s ∈ {1, . . . , d¯} with
M¯1 ≥ M¯2 ≥ . . . ≥ M¯d¯.
We show in Appendix C
11In a linear conflict graph, the number of independent sets grows exponentially with M . Since I1, I2 are not the only independent sets
(Fig. 1), thus, it is not apriori clear whether every NE strategy profile only selects independent sets among I1, I2 with positive probability.
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Fig. 8: Independent sets of same cardinality are grouped together. Thus, |I1| = . . . = |Ik1| . I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 = I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1.
If node a belongs to I1, then it must belong to I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1, but it can not belong to in I¯s, s > k1.
Lemma 9. Ms = M¯s, thus d = d¯.
Thus, |Is| = |I¯s|, s ∈ {1, . . . , d} . Since the solution of (25) and (26) only depend on the cardinalities of Is,
hence if a primary selects the partition I¯1, . . . , I¯d then a primary selects independent sets by solving (25) and (26).
Since the solution of (25) and (26) is unique by Theorem 3, hence, if |Is| = |I¯k|, they are selected with identical
probability. Thus, if a ∈ Is, and a ∈ I¯k such that |Is| = |I¯k| then, the node selection probability at node a at any
channel state will be identical. However, if a ∈ I¯k and |I¯k| 6= |Is|, then the node selection probability may be
different. We eliminate the above possibility in the following which we also show in Appendix C.
Lemma 10. If |Ij | 6= |I¯k|, then Ij ∩ I¯k = Φ.
We have explained the relationship between I1, . . . , Id and I¯1, . . . , I¯d in Fig. 8. The proof of Theorem 5 readily
follows from the fact that the node selection probability is identical irrespective of the partitions selected by
primaries. The detailed proof is given below:
Proof of Theorem 5: First, we show the following: if αa,j (α¯a,j resp.) is the node selection probability when a
primary selects among independent sets among I1, . . . , Id (I¯1, . . . , I¯d¯ resp.) such that (25) and (26) are satisfied,
then αa,j = α¯a,j . It will essentially prove the second part of the theorem.
Fix a node a. Let a ∈ Is and a ∈ I¯k. By theorem 3 there exists a unique solution tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) of (25)
and (26). Since a ∈ Is, thus,
αa,j = qjts,j . (40)
Since d¯ = d and |I¯s| = |Is| for all s ∈ {1, . . . , d} by Lemma 9, thus, (25) and (26) are identical irrespective of
whether a primary selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id or I¯1, . . . , I¯d. Since there exists unique solution of
(26) and (25) (by Theorem 3) , thus tj is the only solution of (25) and (26). Hence, probability with which the
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independent set I¯i is selected at channel state j is ti,j . Since node a ∈ I¯k, thus, from (9)
α¯a,j = qjtk,j . (41)
So, it is clear that if s = k, then αa,j and α¯a,j are identical (by (40) and (41)). Thus, we are only left to show
when s 6= k then (40) and (41) are equal which we show in the following.
By Lemma 10 and 9, we must have |Ik| = |I¯k| = |Is| since a ∈ Is and a ∈ I¯k. Since the solution of (25) and
(26) is the unique (by Theorem 3), thus,
tk,j = ts,j .
Thus, αa,j and α¯a,j are also identical (by (40) and (41)) when s 6= k. Hence, we show that αa,j = α¯a,j .
Now, we show that if a primary selects independent sets among I1, . . . , Id irrespective of partition the other
primaries select such that (25) and (26) are satisfied, then the strategy profile is an NE. This will conclude the
proof since by symmetry, it will follow that if a primary selects independent sets among I¯1, . . . , I¯d irrespective of
the partition other primaries select then the strategy profile is an NE.
We have so far showed that every node in Is is selected with identical probability by each primary irrespective
of the partition selected by them when the independent set selection strategy is of the form (25) and (26). Thus,
at every node a ∈ Is, each primary offers its channel at node a when the channel state is j or higher w.p.∑n
k=j αa,k =
∑n
k=j qjts,j which is equal to γs,j (recall from (16)) irrespective of the partition selected by the
primaries. In proving that a primary does not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the strategy profile which
is of the form (25) and (26) (Theorem 4), we only use the properties of γs,j . Hence, if a primary selects independent
sets among I1, . . . , Id according to (25) and (26) irrespective of the partitions selected by other primaries, then it
is an NE. Hence, the result follows.
V. DIFFERENT CHANNEL STATES AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS
At later stages of deployment, the secondary market will operate at a region consisting of a large number of
locations. The channel states will be different at different locations in this large region which we consider in this
section. We first present specific assumptions that we have made in this scenario (Section V-A). For example,
nodes of commonly observed large conflict graphs exhibit an inherent symmetry in the interference relations, we
therefore consider a class of conflict graphs, known as node symmetric graphs in the literature [6]. We subsequently
obtain a symmetric NE strategy profile SPsym in a node symmetric graph (Section V-B). We show some important
structural properties of SPsym which are significantly different from the symmetric NE strategy profile obtained in
the scenario where the channel state is identical across the network (Theorem 7, Lemmas 12, and 13). We show
that SPsym may not be a NE when the conflict graph is not a node symmetric (Lemma 14). Finally, we analytically
and empirically evaluate the computational issues of computing the strategy SPsym and how a primary can attain a
desired trade-off between the expected payoff and the computational cost by selective estimation of channel states
at randomly selected subset of nodes (Section V-C).
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A. Specific Assumptions
We revert to the notations introduced in Sections II and III. Specifically, we do not need simplifications of the
notations used for the first setting which have been introduced in Section IV-A.
1) n = 1: In the previous setting (Section IV) we consider that the channel state is the same across the locations,
thus, a primary always selects an independent set from the conflict graph G whenever the channel is available (i.e.
the channel is not in state 0). Thus, a primary knows that its competitors always select independent sets from G
(a primary does not select any independent set when the channel state is 0). In the current setting, the conflict
graph representation of the region depends on the channel state vectors. Since the conflict graph representation can
be different for different channel state vectors (GJ may not be equal to GK when J 6= K), thus, a primary does
not know the conflict graphs from which its competitors are selecting their independent sets. Thus, the collection
of independent sets from which a primary selects its independent set may be different for different primaries.
Additionally, the strategy space P (|P| = (n+ 1)|V | − 1) increase exponentially with the number of nodes. Thus,
obtaining an NE in this setting is challenging. In order to simplify the setting, we consider
Assumption 2. n = 1 i.e. the channel is either available (i.e. at state 1) or not available (i.e. at state 0) at each
node, but still the channel state can be different at different nodes.
Note that even though n = 1, the cardinality of strategy space P is 2V − 1 which is still exponential in the
number of nodes and the conflict graph representation will be different for different channel state vectors.
Definition 9. Since n = 1, we drop the index j from αa,j and Pa,j in (8) corresponding to the channel state at
a given location. We denote αa as the probability with which an available channel at node a is offered under a
symmetric strategy profile and Pa as the set of channel state vectors where the channel state is 1 at node a.
Note that from Theorem 1 and (5), the upper endpoint of the penalty selection strategy is v at all nodes. The
maximum expected payoff of a primary at node a under a symmetric NE strategy is
pa − c = (f1(v)− c)(1− w(αa)) (42)
2) Node Symmetric Graphs: We consider large size wireless networks. As an analytical abstraction, we mainly
consider infinite size conflict graphs. In large conflict graphs, there is an inherent symmetry in the interference
relations among the nodes in the network. We, therefore consider node symmetric graphs, which in the literature
is also known as node transitive graphs [6].
First, we provide a formal definition of node symmetric graph. Towards that end, we first define an automorphism
in a conflict graph G. We denote V (G) as the set of nodes of G.
Definition 10. An automorphism is a bijective mapping F : V (G) → V (G) such that nodes F (a) and F (b) are
adjacent12 if and only if nodes a, b are adjacent in G.
12In an undirected graph, two nodes are adjacent iff there is an edge between them.
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Fig. 9: Left hand figure shows a linear graph with 4 nodes. Right hand figure an automorphism where F (1) = 4, F (2) =
3, F (3) = 2, F (4) = 1. However, there is no automorphism between nodes 2 and 1. If there is an automorphism such that
F (2) = 1, then by the property of automorphism nodes F (2) and F (3) should be adjacent and nodes F (2) and F (1) also
should be adjacent, but since F (2) = 1, thus, either F (3) or F (1) will not be adjacent to node F (2) since node 1 only has
one degree in G.
In an automorphism, the nodes are renumbered such that it maintains the adjacency between the nodes. For
example, consider a linear graph consisting of 4 nodes. Fig. 9 shows an automorphism on this graph. Now we are
ready to define the node symmetric graph.
Definition 11. [6] In a node symmetric graph, for every pair of vertices a and b of G, there is some automorphism
F : V (G)→ V (G) such that F (a) = b.
For a graph to be node symmetric every node should be mapped to every other node through an automorphism.
Informally, in a node symmetric graph the graphs looks the same from each node.
For example cyclic graph is a node symmetric graph. But linear graph with 4 nodes is not a node symmetric
graph since there is no automorphism between nodes 1 and 2 (Fig. 9).
Now, we provide some examples of infinite node symmetric graphs which resemble the conflict graphs of large
wireless networks.
• Infinite linear graph with no end points (Fig. 11): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph of the network
of a large number of wireless access points arranged in a linear fashion.
• Infinite square graphs (Fig. 12): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph of wireless networks in a large
region with square cells.
• Infinite grid graphs (Fig. 13): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph of a large shopping mall.
• Infinite triangular graphs (Fig. 14): This is an abstraction of the conflict graph representation of large number
of hexagonal cells [31].
There are also several commonly observed node symmetric conflict graphs which are finite. For example, cyclic
graph of any size is a node symmetric graph 13. Cyclic conflict graph represents a collection of wireless access points
arranged in a circular fashion, possibly circumambulating a city or ring size road. Figure 10 also shows a finite node
symmetric graph and the corresponding wireless network. The complete graphs 14 are also node symmetric graphs.
We find a symmetric NE in a node symmetric graph irrespective of whether it is finite or infinite (Theorem 7).
Note from Section IV-B that the commonly observed conflict graphs of small networks are mean valid graphs
13Note that cyclic graph is not a mean valid graph if |V | > 3 and |V | is odd, thus, node symmetric graphs may not be mean valid graphs.
14In a complete graph a node has edge with every other node.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Circles in Figure (a) shows the ranges of the wireless access points located at the center of the circle. Figure (b) shows
the corresponding conflict graph with each circle is represented as a node. Each circle intersects with 1 hop and 2 neighbors,
thus, in the conflict graph each node has edges with 1 hop and 2 hop neighbors. The conflict graph is a node symmetric graph.
Fig. 11: Infinite linear graph with no end-points: each node has degree 2.
which we analyze in the previous setting. These graphs may not be node symmetric graphs.
3) Probability Distribution of Channel State Vectors: In the previous setting, we consider an extreme case where
the channel state is identical across each location. In a large network, the channel states will be different. However,
the channel states are often spatially proximal. Since the graph is large, like the interference relationship we
expect that the statistical correlation pattern would also exhibit some symmetry. We consider one such symmetric
relationship among the channel states across the network which arise naturally.
First, we define an isomorphism between two graphs:
Definition 12. Two graphs G and H are isomorphic to each other if there is a bijective mapping F : V (G)→ V (H)
such that any two vertices F (a), F (b) are adjacent in H if and only if a, b are adjacent in G.
Informally, if two graphs look alike subject to renumbering of nodes, then they are isomorphic to each other.
Note that automorphism is a special case of isomorphism which occurs when H = G (Definition 10).
We assume that
Fig. 12: Infinite square graph: each node
has degree 4.
Fig. 13: Infinite Grid graph: each node
has degree 8.
Fig. 14: Infinite Triangular Graph: each
node has degree 6.
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Assumption 3. qJ and qK are identical whenever the GJ and GK are isomorphic to each other.
Intuitively, since GJ and GK are alike subject to the renumbering of nodes, we therefore expect qJ = qK . We
show in Section V-A4 that the above assumption implies that
Lemma 11. The probability that a channel of a primary is in state 1 at a given location is the same across the
network.
However, the converse of the above result not true in general.
We now provide some examples of joint probability distributions which arise in practice and satisfy Assumption 3.
Independent and identically distributed channel states: The state of the channel is i = 1 w.p. q at a given location
independent of the channel states at other locations. At a given channel state vector J , if the channel is available at
nj number of nodes, then qJ = qnj (1− q)|V |−nj . When GJ and GK are isomorphic, then both contain the same
number of nodes, thus, the number of locations where the channel state is 1 (0, respv.) are the same in channel
state vectors J and K. Hence, the probability distributions qJ and qK are identical whenever GJ and GK are
isomorphic.
Correlated Channel states: We now show that Assumption 3 can accommodate statistical correlations across
the channel states at different nodes. We provide an example in a small node symmetric graph. Consider a linear
graph with 2 nodes such that q(1,0) = q(0,1). Since G(0,1) and G(1,0) are the only possible isomorphic graphs
in this case, thus, the above joint probability distribution satisfies Assumption 3. Now, if q(1,1) > q(1,0) = q(0,1)
and q(0,0) > q(1,0) = q(0,1), then, the channel states are not independent15. Thus, Assumption 3 allows correlation
among the channel states across the locations. Also note that the above probability distributions commonly arise in
practice. This is because when the channel is in state 1 (0 respv.) at one location, then there is a higher probability
that the channel is in state 1 (0 respv.) compared to state 0 (1 respv.) at other location.
The joint probability distributions of random variables associated with spatial locations and exhibiting correlations
are often represented as Markov Random Field. We provide a formal definition of Markov random field in
Appendix F and show that the Markov random field modeling of channel states where the channel states in
neighboring locations are correlated, satisfy Assumption 3 under some additional assumptions which naturally
arise (Lemma 26 in Appendix F).
4) Proof of Lemma 11: We first show Observation 3. Subsequently, we show Lemma 11.
Observation 3. Consider any pair of nodes a and b. For distinct channel state vectors J, J1 ∈ Pa (Definition 9),
there exists distinct channel state vectors K,K1 ∈ Pb such that GK and GK1 are isomorphic to GJ and GJ1
respectively, such that the in the isomorphic function F (a) = b (Definition 12).
15Suppose that the channel is in state 1 at node i w.p. qi independent of the channel state at other location, then, q1,0 = q0,1 implies that
q1 = q2. Now, q1(1− q1) can not be less than both q21(= q1,1) & (1− q1)2(= q0,0), hence, independent channel states can not satisfy the
above joint distribution.
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Proof: We first show that for a channel state vector J ∈ Pa there exists a channel state vector K ∈ Pb such
that GK is isomorphic to GJ and in the isomorphic function F (a) = b. Since the graph is node symmetric, thus,
there exists an automorphism F (·) (Definition 10) such that F (a) = b. Now consider the channel state vector K
where the channel is available only at nodes F (a1) if a1 ∈ V (GJ). In the conflict graph representation of GK , the
set of edges are the edges incident on F (a1) where a1 ∈ GJ . Since F (·) is itself is an automorphism on G, thus
F (a1) and F (a2) are adjacent in GK if and only if a1 and a2 are adjacent in GJ . Hence, F (·) is an isomorphic
mapping from V (GJ) to V (GK) such that F (a) = b.
Note that since J is arbitrary, thus, if J1 ∈ Pa, then, following the above procedure we obtain an isomorphic
graph GK1 such that F (a) = b in GK1 . Since F (·) is automorphism and thus, F (·) is bijective. Thus, if J1 6= J ,
then, using the function F (·) we obtain a channel state vector K1 which is different from K. Also note that
b ∈ V (GK1) since F (a) = b and a ∈ V (GJ1). Hence, the result follows.
Now, we show Lemma 11.
Proof: Consider any two nodes a and b. Recall the definition of Pa (Definition 9). First, note that |Pa| =
|Pb| = 2|V |−1 since the channel state must be 1 at node a (node b, respv.) for every channel state vector in Pa (Pb
respv.). Now, the probability that the channel state is 1 at node a is
βa =
∑
J:J∈Pa
qJ
and the probability that the channel state is 1 at node b is
βb =
∑
K:K∈Pb
qK
Note that by Observation 3, for distinct channel state vectors J, J1 ∈ Pa there exist distinct channel state vectors
K,K1 ∈ Pb such that GK , GK1 are isomorphic to GJ and GJ1 respectively. Also note that cardinalities of Pa and
Pb are the same. Since qJ = qK whenever GJ and GK are isomorphic to each other, thus, we obtain
βa = βb (43)
Hence, the result follows.
B. Symmetric NE strategy Profile
We, first, obtain a symmetric NE strategy profile (Theorem 7). We then show that the NE strategy has an important
structural difference compared to the NE strategy in the previous setting (Section IV) where the channel state is
the same across the network (Lemmas 12, 13).
We first start with introducing a notation. Let Imax,J be the set of maximum independent sets (i.e. independent
sets of highest cardinalities) of the graph GJ .
Strategy Profile (SPsym): A primary selects each of the independent set within the set Imax,J with probability
1
|Imax,J | and select other independent sets with probability 0 at channel state vector J .
Theorem 7. The Strategy profile SPsym is an NE strategy profile.
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A primary only needs to find the maximum independent sets in order to find the NE strategy profile SPsym.
In contrast to SPsym, a primary may select an independent set which is not a maximum independent set in the
scenario where the channel state is identical across the locations (Theorems 2 and 4). Note that in SPsym a primary
puts equal weight on each of the maximum independent sets in GJ . Hence, a primary needs not communicate with
other primaries to obtain its strategy. Hence, SPsym is easy to implement.
Lemma 12. Expected payoff at every node is the same under SPsym.
Intuitively, since the graph is node symmetric, each node belongs to the same number of maximum independent
sets, thus a channel is offered with the same probability at every node under SPsym; thus, the expected payoff is the
same at every node. Since each node is selected with the same probability, hence there is an equity in secondary
access of the channel amongst different nodes as opposed to that scenario where the channel state is identical
across the network (Example 1).
We show that unlike in the scenario where the channel state is the same across the network (Theorem 6), the
symmetric NE may not be unique in linear conflict graph in this setting.
Lemma 13. There may exist infinitely many symmetric NEs in the linear conflict graph.
The proof of the above lemma is algebraic and we relegate it to Appendix E.
We also show in Appendix E that symmetry in interference relations among the nodes is required for SPsym to
be an NE.
Lemma 14. SPsym may not be an NE for a finite linear graph which is not a node symmetric graph.
1) Proof of Theorem 7: We use Observation 3 stated in previous subsection (Section V-A4). Since the strategy
profile is symmetric, it is enough to show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate from SPsym when
other primaries also select SPsym.
We first give an outline of the proof. First, we show that the maximum expected payoff attainable by primary 1
is identical across the nodes using the node symmetric property and Assumption 3. Thus, it directly implies that
primary 1 will attain the maximum expected payoff by selecting a maximum independent set. Since SPsym only
randomizes among the maximum independent sets, thus, primary 1 will not have any incentive to deviate from
SPsym which in turn proves Theorem 5. The details of the proof is given below.
In order to show Theorem 7 we show the following:
i) First, we show that the node selection probability αa for a primary is identical when Assumption 3 is satisfied
for each node under SPsym using Node symmetric graph and Observation 3.
ii) Subsequently, we show that when all primaries other than primary 1 select SPsym, then the maximum expected
payoff obtained by primary 1 is identical across the nodes.
iii) Finally, we show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from SPsym which shows
that SPsym is indeed an NE.
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Part i): First, we introduce some notations. Let Iamax,J be the set of maximum independent sets of GJ which
contains node a. Note that the node a can only be selected at a channel state vector J if J ∈ Pa (Definition 9).
Thus, under the strategy profile SPsym the node selection probability at node a i.e. αa is
αa =
∑
J∈Pa
|Iamax,J |
|Imax,J |qJ (44)
Now, we show that αa = αb where b 6= a. By Observation 3 for every GJ , there exists a distinct GK which is
isomorphic to GJ such that in the isomorphic mapping F (a) = b. Thus, |Ibmax,K | = |Iamax,J |. Since GJ and GK
are isomorphic to each other thus |Imax,J | = |Imax,K |. Also note that, qJ = qK since GJ is isomorphic to GK by
Assumption 3. Finally, note that the cardinalities of Pa and Pb are the same. Hence, αa = αb for any two nodes
a, b ∈ V by (44). Hence, the node selection probability is the same at every node.
Part ii): When all the other primaries apart from primary 1 selects SPsym, then at node a , the channel is offered
for sale at node a w.p. αa by other primaries apart from primary 1. Thus, by Theorem 1, when all the other primaries
select SPsym, then the maximum expected payoff obtained by primary 1 at node a is (f1(v)−c)(1−w(αa)) (from
(42)). Moreover, by Theorem 1 the payoff is obtained by selecting any penalty within [L1, v]. Since αa’s are
identical, hence, the maximum attainable expected payoff by primary 1 is identical at each node.
Part iii): Consider a channel state vector J . Since the maximum attainable expected payoff at every node is
identical, hence, primary 1 can attain the total maximum expected payoff only by selecting a maximum independent
set of GJ when other primaries select the strategy SPsym. Under SPsym, primary 1 randomizes among the maximum
sets of GJ . Hence, the total expected payoff of primary 1 is equal to the maximum expected payoff. Hence, primary 1
does not have any incentive to deviate from SPsym when other primaries select SPsym. Thus, SPsym is an NE.
2) Proof of Lemma 12: Note that the proof of this result directly follows from part (ii) of the Theorem 7 where
we have shown that primary 1 will attain the same expected payoff at every node of the conflict graph if primary
1 selects SPsym when the other primaries also select strategy SPsym.
C. Computational Complexity
In SPsym a primary needs to enumerate the maximum independent sets at a given channel state vector. In general,
the number of maximum independent sets scales exponentially with the number of nodes. But if a graph consists of
disjoint components, then a primary can compute the maximum independent sets of each component and compute
the strategy profile in each component in parallel. Hence, the size of the component will govern the computation
time.
The conflict graph of a primary depends on the channel state vector which evolves randomly. Hence, the conflict
graphs are random graphs. Thus, it is important to find the average size of a component in a conflict graph which will
govern the average computation time of maximum independent sets. In the following, we provide a bound on the
expected size of a component for some node symmetric graphs that arise in practice. We also discuss how primaries
can govern the component size using random sampling technique (selecting each node w.p. p) . Throughout this
section, we consider that the channel states are I.I.D. where the channel state is 1 at a given location w.p. q.
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Let ∆ be the degree of a node. We consider those node symmetric graphs where ∆ is finite. Nodes in most of
the conflict graphs that we have discussed in Section V-A2 have finite degrees. For example, in cyclic graph (of
any size) ∆ = 2, in infinite linear graph ∆ = 2, in infinite square graph (Fig. 11), ∆ = 4 (Fig. 12), in infinite grid
graph ∆ = 8 (Fig. 13), in infinite triangular graph ∆ = 6 (Fig. 14).
We find out the expected size of a component C originating from node a in a conflict graph GJ . Since the graph
is a node symmetric graph, hence the expected size of a component originating from any other node will be the
same. Each node has an expected degree of q∆. The component C grows when GJ contains neighbors of node a,
the neighbors of the neighbors of node a and so on. Thus, the growth of C can be compared to the Galton-Watson
branching process [32] where each individual gives birth to q∆ number of children on average. The only difference
in our approach to the Galton-Watson process is that the number of nodes added each step may be smaller as some
of the neighbors of a node may already be in C, thus, reducing the number of neighbors that can be added in C.
Thus, the expected size of C can be upper bounded by the expected umber of total descendants in Galton-Watson
process [32]. Hence, the upper bound of expected size of C is obtained from [32]
Lemma 15. E(C) ≤ 1
1− q∆ if q∆ < 1.
A primary can not control q, hence, the component size (and thus, the computational complexity) can be large for
higher q. Thus, a primary may estimate its channel quality only at a subset of the locations of the region instead of
the whole region and sell its channel only among the locations where it knows the transmission quality in order to
minimize the computation cost. Equivalently, a primary will consider that the channel state is 0 at locations where
it does not estimate its channel quality. In one simplistic setting which we consider, each primary computes the
transmission quality at a node w.p. p independent of the other nodes. A primary does not know the nodes where
its competitors are estimating their channel states. But , it knows p. Thus, a primary is aware of the fact that the
channel state is 1 at any given node of its competitor w.p. pq independent of the channel states at other locations.
Thus, the probability distribution satisfies Assumption 3. Hence, the strategy profile SPsym will be a symmetric NE
strategy profile in this setting where the channel states are I.I.D. and the channel is in state 1 at a given location
w.p. pq instead of q. Thus, from Lemma 15 the expected size of component is now upper bounded by
E(C) ≤ 1
1− pq∆ if pq∆ < 1 (45)
Note that the above procedure also decreases the measurement and estimation cost, since a primary only estimates
the channel states at a randomly selected subset of locations.
Note that the right hand side in (45) increases as pq∆ increases. If a primary selects lower (higher, respv.) p
the expected component size will decrease (increase, respv.), and thus, the computation complexity will decrease
(increase, respv.); The bound in (45) also decreases (increases, respv.). However, the expected payoff of a primary
will also decrease (increase, respv.) with decrease in p (increase, respv.) since the number of nodes where a primary
can potentially sell its channel also decreases (increases, respv). Hence, a primary has to judiciously select p in
order to achieve a desired trade-off between the computation complexity, and the expected payoff.
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Fig. 15: Mean size of the largest component in a Square Graph
and Linear graph for pq = 0.5. The square graph consists of a
j rows and columns. We vary j while we increase the number
of nodes.
Fig. 16: Mean size of the largest component in a Square Graph
and Linear graph with 100 nodes.
We now empirically investigate the variation of the mean size of the largest component with the number of nodes
and the parameter pq. For each value of pq, we generate a certain number of random graphs. We compute the
average of the largest component over 25 samples. The number 25 has been chosen since the average converges
in 25 samples. Figure 15 shows the variation of the mean size of the largest component as the number of nodes
increases. Figure 15 reveals that the growth of the average size of the largest component in a square graph is linear
(not exponential) with the number of nodes whereas the growth of the mean size of the largest component in a linear
graph is very slow with the number of nodes. Additionally, when pq = 0.5, the upper bound in (45) is infinite both
for square and linear graph, however, Fig. 15 shows that the expected size of the largest component is moderate
in the square graph as well as in the linear graph even when the number of nodes are large. Fig. 16 reveals that
when pq is exceeds a threshold the mean size of a largest component increases substantially in both linear conflict
graph and square conflict graph. However, Fig. 16 reveals that the upper bound computed in (45) is loose. For
example, when 0.25 ≤ pq ≤ 0.6, the upper bound in (45) is infinite for square graph, however, Fig. 16 shows that
the average size of the largest component is moderate. In the linear graph, the mean size of the largest component
is small even when 0.5 ≤ pq ≤ 0.75 whereas the upper bound computed in (45) is infinite when 0.5 ≤ pq ≤ 0.75.
VI. RANDOM DEMAND
Till now we have assumed that the number of secondaries (m) is constant at each node. But our analysis will
readily generalize to the scenario where the number of secondaries at a given location is Z ≥ 1 where Z is a
random variable independent of the number of secondaries at other locations with an additional assumption the
p.m.f. Pr(Z = m) = κm must satisfy the condition
∑l−1
m=1 κm > 0 (i.e. the total number of primaries exceeds the
total number of secondaries with positive probability but not w.p. 1). A primary does not know Z apriori, however,
it knows the p.m.f of Z. The analysis will go through with the following modifications in (4)
w(x) =
min{max(Z),l−1}∑
m=1
κm
l−1∑
i=m
(
l − 1
i
)
xi(1− x)l−i−1 (46)
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Fig. 17: This figure shows the variation of efficiency with m.
We consider a 5 × 5 grid graph (see Fig. 3). This is a mean
valid graph with d = 4 and |I1| = 9, |I2| = |I3| = 6, |I4| = 4.
We use the following parameter values, l = 20, n = 3, v =
100, c = 1, gi(x) = x2 − i3, q1 = q2 = q3 = 0.2.
Fig. 18: This figure shows the variation of efficiency with
m when the channel states are independent and identically
distributed at each location with qi = 0.5, i = 0, 1. We consider
a cyclic graph of 100 We use the following parameter values:
l = 10, v = 11, c = 1.
VII. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
We numerically study the impact of competition on the payoffs of the primaries in the scenarios which we
consider. Towards that end, we compare the payoff under the symmetric NE strategy, RM,NE , with the maximum
possible value of social welfare, ROPT which is obtained when all the primaries collude.
RM,NE = Number of Primaries × Expected payoff of each primary
Definition 13. The efficiency of NE is the ratio of the total expected payoff of primaries and the optimal value of
social welfare (ROPT ).
In other words, efficiency (ηM )=
l ·RM,NE
RM,OPT
.
Fig. 17 shows the variation of efficiency with the number of secondaries (m) in the scenario where the channel
state remains the same throughout the network. Fig. 18 shows the variation of efficiency with m in the scenario
where the channel state can be different at different locations. Both the figures reveal that ηM increases with increase
in m. This is because when m is low, competition becomes intense and primaries select lower penalties. Primaries
also select independent sets of lower cardinalities when the channel state is the same at each location in Fig. 17.
But if they collude with each other, they still can offer highest penalty and only select the independent sets of the
largest cardinalities in both of the settings, which lead to high payoff.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied a price competition model with the spatial reuse property where each primary selects a price and
a set of non-interfering locations depending on the quality of its channel. We have considered two settings. In the
first setting, we consider that the channel state is the same across the networks. We have shown that there exists a
symmetric NE strategy profile in the class of mean valid graphs and we have computed a storage and computational
efficient NE. The NE strategy profile can be readily implemented as primaries need not communicate with each
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other even when the NE strategy is not unique. We show that the symmetric NE strategy profile is unique in a
linear conflict graph.
In the second setting, we allow that the channel state can be different at different locations. The above consideration
significantly complicates the analysis as we have discussed in Section V-A. We, therefore, consider that the channel
is either available or unavailable at each node. We have shown that there exists a symmetric NE strategy profile in
the class of node symmetric graphs. In order to obtain the symmetric NE strategy, a primary only needs to enumerate
the maximum independent sets. The NE strategy is also easy to implement. We have shown that symmetric NE
strategy may not be unique in a linear conflict graph in contrast to the first setting.
The characterization of an NE in the second setting where the available channel may belong to multiple states
remains open. The analytical results and tools that we have provided in this paper may provide the basis for
developing a framework for this problem.
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APPENDIX
We prove Theorem 3 (Section IV-E) in Appendix A. Subsequently, we show Theorem 4 (Section IV-E) in
Appendix B. We show Lemmas 9 and 10 used in Section IV-G to prove Theorem 5 in Appendix C. We show
Theorem 6 (Section IV-G) in Appendix D. We prove Lemmas 13 and 14 (Section V-B) in Section E. Finally, in
Appendix F we provide a formal definition of Markov Random Field and show that Markov random field modeling
of correlated channel states satisfy Assumption 3 (Section V-A3) under some additional assumptions which naturally
arise in practice.
A. Proof of Theorem 3(Section IV-E)
We proceed in two parts. First, we will prove that there exists a distribution tj = (t1,j , . . . , td,j) which satisfies
(25) and (26). Subsequently, we will prove that such a distribution is the unique one.
Existence: First, we will show that the statement is true for j = n. Now, let x ∈ [M1W (qn),M1] and s ∈
{1, . . . , d}. We will show that if x ≤Ms then
MsW (rqn) = x (47)
November 21, 2018 DRAFT
40
has a unique solution in r, which we will denote as ts,n(x). Let, h(ts,n) = MsW (ts,nqn), then
h(1) = MsW (qn)
≤M1W (qn) ≤ x (48)
and
h(0) = Ms ≥ x. (49)
As W (·) is strictly decreasing and continuous, so is h(·), thus from (48) and (49), there exists a unique solution
ts,n(x) between 0 and 1, such that h(ts,n) = x. Note that
ts,n(x) = 0 (if x = Ms). (50)
h(ts,n) is strictly decreasing in 0 ≤ ts,n ≤ 1. Hence, inverse exists and h−1 is also continuous as h is continuous.
But, x = h(ts,n(x)). Hence, ts,n(x) = h−1(x). Thus, ts,n(x) is continuous for x ≤ Ms. For x > Ms, define
ts,n(x) = 0. With the above definition and (50) we obtain ts,n(x) is continuous function on [M1W (qn),M1] and
thus
ts,n(x) = 0 (if x ≥Ms). (51)
Now, let
Tn(x) =
d∑
s=1
ts,n(x). (52)
As h(ts,n) is strictly decreasing on 0 ≤ ts,n ≤ 1 for s ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ts,n(x) is strictly decreasing for x ≤ Ms.
Hence, Tn(x) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ [M1W (qn),M1]. Also, note that, ts,n(x) = 0 for Ms < x ≤M1. Thus,
for x = M1, ts,n(x) = 0 ∀s, as Ms ≤M1, hence for x = M1,
Tn(x) = 0 (53)
Now, for x = M1W (qn), t1,n(x) = 1, ts,n(x) ≥ 0 s ∈ {2, . . . , d}, thus
Tn(x) ≥ 1. (54)
As ts,n(x) are continuous, so is Tn(x). Thus, from(53), (54) and intermediate value property, there exists a x∗ ∈
[M1W (qn),M1] such that Tn(x∗) = 1 and this is unique as Tn(·) is strictly decreasing. Let, d′n = max{s : Ms >
x∗}. By definition of ts,n, for s = 1, . . . , d′n, MsW (ts,n(x∗)qn) = x∗ ts,n(x∗) > 0 and for s > d′n, ts,n(x∗) = 0
(by (51)). Since γs,n = ts,nqn (from (16)) and W (0) = 1, thus MsW (γs,n) = x∗ for s ≤ d′n and for s > d′n
MsW (γs,n) ≤ x∗. Hence, {t1,n(x∗), . . . , td,n(x∗)} constitute a probability distribution and satisfy the equations
(25) and (26), with dn = d′n and γs,n+1 = 0. Thus, the result is true for n.
Let, the statement be true for k + 1, we have to show that the statement is indeed true for k. As the statement
is true for k + 1, thus, there exists unique distribution tk+1 = (t1,k+1, . . . , td,k+1) such that (25) and (26) holds
for j = k + 1. The argument will be similar to the case when i = n with finding unique solution to the equation
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MsW (ts,k(x)qk + γs,k+1) = x for x ∈ [M1W (qk + γ1,k+1),M1W (γ1,k+1)] for x > MsW (γs,k+1) and making
ts,k = 0 for x ≥MsW (γs,k+1). Hence we omit the proof. Thus, the result is true by the principle of mathematical
induction.
Uniqueness: We will prove the uniqueness by Induction hypothesis. First, consider the state n.
To reach a contradiction, assume that there exists e, f ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that t′n = (t′1,n, . . . , t′d,n), t¯n = (t¯1,n, . . . , t¯d,n),
t′s,n = 0 (respectively, t¯s,n = 0) for s > e (respectively s > f ) and for some y and z:
y =M1W (t
′
1,nqn) = . . . = MeW (t
′
e,nqn) ≥Me+1W (t′e+1,nqn) (55)
z =M1W (t¯1,nqn) = . . . = MfW (t¯f,nqn) ≥Mf+1W (t¯f+1qn). (56)
First, suppose e = f , if y = z, then MsW (t′s,nqn) = MsW (t¯s,nqn) for s ∈ {1, . . . , e}. But, W (·) is a strictly
decreasing and one-to-one mapping, thus t′s,n = t¯s,n for s ∈ {1, . . . , e} and t′s,n = 0 = t¯s,n for s > e, which leads
to a contradiction.
If e = f , but y > z, then MsW (t′s,nqn) > MsW (t¯s,nqn) for s ∈ {1, . . . , e}. As W (·) is strictly decreasing
function, hence we must have t′s,n < t¯s,n. Now, t
′
s,n = 0 for s > e. Thus,
d∑
s=1
t′s,n =
e∑
s=1
t′s,n <
d∑
s=1
t¯s,n = 1.
The above inequality lea leads to a contradiction. Thus y > z is not possible, by symmetry, z > y is not possible.
Now, suppose e > f , thus t′f+1,n > 0. Since W (·) is strictly decreasing function, thus
Mf+1W (t
′
f+1,nqn) < Mf+1. (57)
Since t¯f+1,n = 0, thus
Mf+1W (γf+1,n) = Mf+1. (58)
Thus from (55), (56), (58) and (57), y = Mf+1W (t′f+1,nqn) < Mf+1 ≤ z. So, for s ∈ {1, . . . , f}:
MsW (t
′
s,nqn) < MsW (t¯s,nqn).
Hence, t′s,n > t¯s,n, thus,
∑f
s=1 t
′
s,n >
∑f
s=1 t¯s,n = 1, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, e > f is not possible,
by symmetry, e < f is not possible.
Thus, the result is true for n.
Now, assume that the statement is true for states k+ 1, . . . , n. Since, the statement is true for states k+ 1, . . . , n,
thus t′s,j = t¯s,j ∀s, ∀j ≥ k + 1. Hence,γ′s,j = γ¯s,j ∀s,∀j ≥ k + 1. From (16), γs,k = γs,k+1 + ts,kqk. As
γ′s,k+1 = γ¯s,k+1, the proof will be similar to the case when state is n.
The result follows from the induction hypothesis.
B. Proof of Theorem 4(Section IV-E)
In order to prove Theorem 4 we have to show that any independent set selection strategy of the form (25) and
(26) is an NE. We can not use results derived in Section IV-D which we derive assuming that the strategy profile
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is an NE. However, we use Lemma 8, and Corollary 1 that any independent set selection strategy profile of the
form (25) and (26) satisfies regardless of whether it is an NE or not. We also use the following result which can
be easily seen from from Lemma 8. Since dj ≥ dj+1 (by Lemma 8), hence from (25), ts,k = 0 ∀s > dj , k ≥ j.
Thus, from (16) we obtain
γs,j = 0 for s > dj . (59)
Hence, we can write (26) as
M1W (γ1,j) = . . . = MdjW (γdj ,j) ≥Mdj+1 ≥Mdj+2 ≥ . . . ≥Md. (60)
Now we state and prove Lemmas 16 and 17 which are satisfied by any strategy profile of the form (25) and (26).
We use these results to prove Theorem 4.
Lemma 16. Us,j = Uk,j if ts,j , tk,j > 0
Proof: We prove the statement using induction argument.
The statement is trivially true for j = 1 because Us,1 = v ∀s by (19).
Now, suppose the statement is true for j = i. Then, for any s, k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, ts,i > 0, tk,i > 0, we have
Us,i = Uk,i (61)
Now, let tr,i+1 > 0, tr1,i+1 > 0 for r, r1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Note that Lr,i = Ur,i+1 and Lr1,i = Ur1,i+1 from (19).
Thus, from (20),
Ur,i+1 = Lr,i = gi(
pr,i − c
W (γr,i+1)
+ c) (62)
Ur1,i+1 = Lr1,i = gi(
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i+1)
+ c) (63)
From corollary 1 tr,i > 0, tr1,i > 0 since tr,i+1, tr1,i+1 > 0. Using (61) for r, r1 we have Ur,i = Ur1,i, hence from
(19)
pr,i − c
W (γr,i)
=
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i)
(64)
Now, since tr,i+1 > 0, tr1,i+1 > 0, tr,i > 0, tr1,i > 0 thus r, r1 ≤ di+1 ≤ di (the last inequality follows from
lemma 8). Hence,using (26) for r, r1 we obtain
MrW (γr,i) = Mr1W (γr,i) (65)
MrW (γr,i+1) = Mr1W (γr1,i+1) (66)
Thus, from (64), (65) and (66), we obtain
pr,i − c
W (γr,i+1)
=
pr1,i − c
W (γr1,i+1)
Ur,i+1 = Ur1,i+1 (from (62) and (63))
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Hence, Ur,i+1 = Ur1,i+1. The result follows from the induction hypothesis.
Remark 5. Henceforth we denote Us,j as Uj when ts,j > 0 i.e. s ≤ dj . Note that we have obtained similar result
(Lemma 3) for any NE strategy profile of the form (14). But Lemma 16 is valid for any strategy profile of the form
(25) and (26) satisfies regardless of whether it is an NE or not.
Lemma 17. If j ≥ 2,then for dk ≥ s > dj , Ls,k ≥ Uj , where k < j.
Proof: Let i = max{y ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : ts,y > 0} . Thus, ts,i > 0, ts,i+1 = 0, and s > di+1. Since t1,j > 0
∀j by corollary 1, thus Uk > Ui, (or U1,k > U1,i) if k < i. So, it is enough to show that Ls,i ≥ Ui+1 because
i+ 1 ≤ j and thus Ui+1 ≥ Uj .
Since s > di+1, thus s > dk ∀k > i by Lemma 8. Thus, ts,k = 0 ∀k > i, thus γs,i+1 = 0 (from observation 1)
and thus W (γs,i+1) = 1. Thus, from (20)
Ls,i = gi(ps,i − c+ c)
= gi((fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) + c) (from(18)) (67)
Since L1,i = Ui+1 and p1,i − c = (fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i) from (18); hence, from (20)
L1,i = Ui+1 = gi(
(fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i)
W (γ1,i+1)
+ c) (68)
Since s > di+1, hence using (60) for state i+ 1, we obtain
M1W (γ1,i+1) ≥Ms (69)
Again using (60) for state i and noting that 1, s ≤ di, we obtain
M1W (γ1,i) = MsW (γs,i)
W (γ1,i)
W (γs,i)
=
Ms
M1
≤W (γ1,i+1) (from(69)) (70)
Since gi(·) is strictly increasing, in order to show that Ui ≤ Ls,i, from (67) and (68) it is sufficient to show the
following
(fi(Ui)− c)W (γ1,i)
W (γ1,i+1)
≤ (fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) (71)
Since fi(Ui) > c, (71) readily follows from (70).
Now we are ready to show Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4: We will show that for channel state j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, probability distribution ts,j as described
in (25) and (26) for s ∈ {1, . . . , d} is a best response.
1) First, we will show that under the strategy profile for s ≤ dj , at any independent set Is,maximum expected
payoff is given by P ∗j (equation (24)) and the maximum value is obtained at each penalty value in the interval
[Ls,j , Uj ] at every node of Is. (Case i)
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2) Next, we will show that for any choice of penalty a primary can only attain at most an expected payoff of
P ∗j at any Is, s > dj (Case ii and Case iii).
3) Finally, we will show that if a primary selects any other independent set i.e. apart from I1, . . . , Id then its
expected payoff is upper bounded by P ∗j for any choice of penalty (Case iv).
Case i:At independent set Is, s ≤ dj .
In this case ts,j > 0. From Theorem 1, Lemma 2 and (18) at a node D ∈ Is, s ≤ dj , a primary gets a maximum
payoff of ps,j − c when the channel state is j. Since s ≤ dj , hence Us,j = Uj . Thus,
ps,j − c = (fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) (from (18)).
Thus, the expected payoff that a primary obtains when channel state is j, at independent set Is,
Ms(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = P ∗j (from(24)).
Hence, payoff at each node of independent set Is, s ≤ dj is
(fj(Uj)− c)W (γs,j) = ps,j − c =
P ∗j
Ms
. (72)
From Theorem 1, the best response penalty set is [Ls,j , Uj ] under ts,k k = 1, . . . , n at node D. Thus, for any
x /∈ [Uj , Ls,j ], payoff is atmost equal to (72). This completes case i.
Case ii: At independent set Is, whered1 ≥ s > dj .
Note from Lemma 8 that di ≥ di+1. Thus, in this case we must have k = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : s ≤ di}. As
s ≤ d1, hence this case arises only when j ≥ 2. So, we have Ls,k ≥ Uj , j > k from Lemma 17.
Now, γs,k+1 = 0 as s > dk+1 from (59) and thus, W (γs,k+1) = 1. Thus, the expected payoff to a primary at
Ls,k, when the channel state is j, is (fj(Ls,k)− c). So, any penalty less than Ls,k will fetch a strictly lower payoff
compared to penalty Ls,k at any node at Is. Hence, it is enough to show that if a primary chooses penalty in the
interval [Ls,k, v] at a node of Is, then its payoff will be strictly less than P ∗j /Ms.
If x ∈ [Ls,k, v] then x must belong to interval [Ls,r, Ls,r−1] for some r ≤ k, with Ls,0 = v. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that x ∈ [Ls,i, Ls,i−1] where i ≤ k . From Corollary 1 ts,i > 0, since ts,k > 0; thus
x is a best penalty response for channel state i by Theorem 1. The expected payoff to a primary, when it selects
penalty x at channel state i at a node D ∈ Is, is given by
(fi(x)− c)P (A) = ps,i − c = (fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) (73)
where, P (A) is the probability of winning, when a primary selects penalty x at channel state i, at any node D ∈ Is.
Since s ≤ di, thus from (72) we obtain for state i
P ∗i = Ms(fi(Ui)− c)W (γs,i) = Ms(fi(x)− c)P (A). (74)
Since x ≥ Ls,i and fi(Ls,i) > c from (27), thus fi(x) > c. Since probability of winning only depends on the
penalty selected by a primary, thus, when a primary selects penalty x at node D ∈ Is, at channel state j, its expected
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payoff is
(fj(x)− c)P (A) = P
∗
i
Ms
fj(x)− c
fi(x)− c (from(74)). (75)
Since 1 ≤ di, thus expected payoff at any node of I1 at channel state i is given by (20) and (72)
p1,i − c = (fi(L1,i)− c)W (γ1,i+1) = P
∗
i
M1
. (76)
Again since 1 ≤ dj , thus, at any node of independent set I1, maximum expected payoff obtained by a primary at
channel state j is P ∗j /M1 as given in (72). Expected payoff at L1,i at channel state j is
(fj(L1,i)− c)W (γ1,i+1) ≤
P ∗j
M1
. (77)
If s ≤ di+1, then Ls,i = Ui+1; on the other hand if s > di+1, then by Lemma 17, Ls,i ≥ Ui+1. Hence,
x ≥ Ls,i ≥ Ui+1. Also, note that i < j by definition of i. Since L1,i = Ui+1 (as 1 ≤ di+1); hence, at penalty x,
at channel state j and at a node D ∈ Is, expected payoff to a primary is
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(fj(x)− c)(fi(Ui+1)− c)
(fj(Ui+1)− c)(fi(x)− c) (from (76)&(77))
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(by (2) as x ≥ Ui+1, i < j, fi(Ui+1) > c). (78)
Case iii: s > d1.
We have from (60)
M1W (γ1,1) = . . . = Md1W (γd1,1) ≥Ms s > d1. (79)
Since 1 ≤ dj thus the maximum expected payoff at v is upper bounded by P ∗j /M1 by (72). But, expected payoff
to a primary at channel state j at v at any node of I1 is
(fj(v)− c)W (γ1,1) ≤
P ∗j
M1
. (80)
Since the expected payoff a primary can attain at a node is at most fj(v)− c at channel state j. Thus, a primary’s
expected payoff at any node D ∈ Is is always upper bounded by
fj(v)− c ≤ M1
Ms
(fj(v)− c)W (γ1,1) (from(79))
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
(from (80)). (81)
Case iv: At any independent set other than I1, . . . , Id:
From (72), (78) and (81), at any node at independent set Is, s > dj , we obtain that maximum expected payoff a
primary can obtain for state j-
≤ P
∗
j
Ms
. (82)
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The graph we have considered, is a d-partite graph (Section IV-B) . Now, consider an independent set I which
contains ms(I) number of nodes from Is, s = 1, . . . , d. Then at channel state j, expected payoff at independent set
I is sum of all payoffs at all the nodes contained in I . Hence, from (82)
Expected Payoff at I ≤
d∑
s=1
P ∗j
Ms
ms(I)
= P ∗j
d∑
s=1
ms(I)
Ms
≤ P ∗j (from(12)).
Thus, at any independent set I , expected payoff to a primary at channel state j is at most P ∗j for any selection of
penalty. From case (i) a primary attains P ∗j at Is, s ≤ dj following the strategy profile. Hence, the result follows.
C. Proof of Lemmas 9 and 10
Throughout this section we use |Ii| and Mi, i ∈ {1, . . . , d} (|I¯i| and M¯i, i = 1, . . . , d¯ respv.) interchangeably.
1) Proof of Lemma 9: First we show that M1 = M¯1.
Let M1 6= M¯1. Without loss of generality assume that M1 > M¯1. Let I¯1 consists of ms(I¯1) number of nodes
from Is. Then
d∑
s=1
ms(I¯1)
Ms
≥
d∑
s=1
ms(I¯1)
M1
=
M¯1
M1
> 1. (83)
which contradicts (12).
Suppose that Mj 6= M¯j for some smallest index j ∈ {2, . . . , d}. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Mj < M¯j . By the definition of j, Mk = M¯k for k < j, thus
∑j−1
k=1Mk =
∑j−1
k=1 M¯k. Note that
Mj−1 = M¯j−1 ≥ M¯j > Mj . (84)
We consider two possible scenarios:
Case i: I¯k, k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} does not contain node from Is s ≥ j.
Since
∑j−1
k=1 |I¯k| =
∑j=1
k=1 M¯k =
∑j−1
k=1Mk, thus, I¯j must consist of nodes of only Is, s ≥ j. Let I¯j consist of
ms(I¯j) nodes of Is. Then,
d∑
k=j
mk(I¯j)
Mk
≥
d∑
k=j
mk(I¯j)
Mj
=
|I¯j |
|Ij | > 1 (85)
which is not possible by (12).
Case ii:I¯k contains at least one node from Is s ≥ j for some k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}.
Let I¯k consist of mi(I¯k) number of nodes from Ii. Since Mj−1 > Mj , thus,
ms(I¯k)
Mi
<
ms(I¯k)
Ms
for any s ≤ j
and i > j. By (12) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} we have
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≤ 1
j−1∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≤ j − 1. (86)
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Since I¯k s are disjoint, thus, |I¯1 ∪ . . . I¯j−1| =
∑j−1
k=1 M¯k =
∑j−1
k=1Mk. Thus,
∑j−1
i=1 Mi =
∑j−1
k=1
∑d
i=1mi(I¯k).
Hence,
d∑
i=j
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k) =
j−1∑
i=1
(Mi −
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)). (87)
Since I¯k contains at least one node from Is, s ≥ j, thus, the above expression is strictly positive. Note that
j−1∑
k=1
d∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
≥
j−1∑
k=1
(
j−1∑
i=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
d∑
i=j
mi(I¯k)
Mj
)
=
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
d∑
i=j
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mj
>
j−1∑
i=1
j−1∑
k=1
mi(I¯k)
Mi
+
j−1∑
i=1
Mi −
∑j−1
k=1mi(I¯k)
Mi
(from (87)and Mi > Mj , i < j)
=
j−1∑
i=1
Mi
Mi
= j − 1. (88)
which contradicts (86), hence this case can not arise. Hence, the result follows.
2) Proof of Lemma 10: Let the lowest index be j such that Ij ∩ I¯k 6= Φ but |Ij | 6= I¯k. Thus, Ij contains at least
one node from Ik. Without loss of generality we can assume that |Ij | < |I¯k|.
Since |Ik| = |I¯k| for all k by Lemma 9, thus, Mk > Mj . Let k1 = max{i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1} : Mi > Mj}. Let Ii
consists of ms(Ii) number of nodes from I¯s. Thus,
k1∑
i=1
|Ii| =
d∑
s=1
k1∑
i=1
ms(Ii)
k1∑
i=1
d∑
s=k1+1
ms(Ii) =
k1∑
i=1
Mi −
k1∑
i=1
k1∑
s=1
ms(Ii) (89)
Note that LHS of (89) is always non-negative. Now, we will show that (89) is strictly positive. If it is not strictly
positive then we must have
k1∑
i=1
Mi =
k1∑
i=1
k1∑
s=1
ms(Ii). (90)
But RHS of (90) is equal to
|(I¯1 ∪ I¯2 . . . ∪ I¯k1) ∩ (I1 ∪ I2 . . . ∪ Ik1)|. (91)
and LHS of (90) is equal to
|I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1 | = |I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 |. (92)
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Thus,
I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 = I¯1 ∪ . . . ∪ I¯k1 . (93)
But Ij contains at least one node from I¯l and k ≤ k1 < j. Thus, Ij contains at least one node in common
with I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ik1 which is not possible since Ijs are disjoint. Thus (89) is strictly positive. Thus, there must
exist a i ∈ {1, . . . , k1} such that Ii contains at least one node from I¯s s > k1. Since i ≤ k1 and s > k1, thus,
|I¯s| = |Is| < |Ii|. Hence, we have found a i < j such that Ii contains at least one node from I¯s such that |I¯s| < |Ii|
which contradicts the definition of j. Hence, the result follows.
D. Proof of Theorem 6 (Section IV-G)
In order to prove Theorem 6 we must consider all symmetric NE strategy profiles which need not be of the form
(14); this precludes the use of the results in section IV-D. First, we characterize some properties that any symmetric
NE strategy must follow (Lemmas 19, 21) in Appendix D1. Then we deduce some important properties (Lemma 23
and 24) that any NE strategy profile must satisfy in a linear graph in Appendix D2. We then use those properties
to prove Theorem 6.
1) Properties of any symmetric NE strategy profile (Lemmas 19 and 21): In order to prove Lemma 19 we state
and prove Observations 4, and 5 and Lemma18. We subsequently state and prove Lemma 20 to prove Lemma 21.
We start with some notations, which we use throughout.
Definition 14. us,i,max denotes the maximum expected payoff under an NE strategy for state i at node s 16 .
Recall from (9) that the channel is offered at node a when the state is j with probability αa,j . With slight abuse
of notation, we define γa,i for node a in the following manner:
γa,i =
n∑
j=i
αa,j (94)
Thus, γa,i denotes the probability that the channel is offered at node a when the state is higher or equal to i.
Since we have to consider all NE strategy profiles which may not be of the form (14), thus, the payoff, upper
and lower endpoint need not be the identical at each node of Is at a given channel state. By Lemma 2 if αa,j is
known then the above parameters can be obtained using Lemma 1 with αa,j in place of qj . With slight abuse of
notation we denote pa,i, La,i and Ua,i for node a i.e. for i = 1, . . . , n
pa,i = c+ (fi(Ua,i)− c)W (γa,i)(from (94)&(15)) (95)
La,i = gi(
pa,i − c
W (γa,i+1)
+ c), Ua,i = La,i−1, La,0 = v (96)
16Even if node a is selected with probability 0 when the channel state is i, we can still defined ua,i,max as the maximum expected payoff
that a primary would have obtained if it would select node a
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By Theorem 1 pa,i − c is the expected payoff at node a when the channel state is i if node a is selected with
positive probability. By Theorem 1 a primary selected penalty from the interval [Ls,j , Ua,j ] when the channel state
is j using the distribution (4) with αa,j in place of qj .
Now we state some observations which we use throughout.
Observation 4. At node a, γa,k = γa,k1 +
∑k1−1
i=k αa,i where n ≥ k1 > k.
Observation 4 readily follows from (94). Since from (94)
γa,k =
k1−1∑
i=k
αa,i +
n∑
i=k1
αa,i =
k1−1∑
i=k
αa,i + γa,k1 (from (94))
Similar to observation 2, using observation 4, (96) and (95) we obtain
Observation 5. At node a, Ua,j = La,j for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} iff ta,j = 0. Ua,j = La,k iff ta,i = 0 ∀k < i < j.
Hence, Ua,j = v iff ta,k = 0 ∀k < j.
Lemma 18. Maximum expected payoff under the NE strategy profile at a node s is obtained at Ls,i when channel
states are i and i+ 1. When the channel state is 1, primary attains its maximum expected payoff at v at any node.
Note that if αs,i > 0 then by Theorem 1 Ls,i is a best penalty response at channel state i. Here we show that
even if αs,i = 0, then the maximum expected payoff is obtained at Ls,i at node s under any NE strategy profile.
Proof: First, we will prove the statement for channel state i. The proof for channel state i + 1 will readily
follow.
Suppose the statement is false for channel state i. Hence, there exists x at which expected payoff is higher compared
to the expected payoff at Ls,i when the channel state is i. First we rule out x > Ls,i (case i) and then x < Ls,i
(case ii).
case i: x > Ls,i:
Note that this case can not arise when Ls,i = v. Hence, Ls,i < v; thus by observation 5 there must exist j =
max{1, . . . , i} such that αs,j > 0. If j = i, then Ls,j = Ls,i; on the other hand if αs,i = 0 then by observation 5
Ls,i = Us,j+1 = Ls,j . Expected payoff to a primary at state i at x is
(fi(x)− c)P (A) (97)
where P (A) is the probability of winning at penalty x at node s. By theorem 1, Ls,j is a best penalty response at
node s when the channel state is j. Now, expected payoff at Ls,j when channel state is j, is
ps,j − c = (fj(Ls,j)− c)W (γs,j+1) (from (96))
Note that players with channel state higher than j select a penalty lower than or equal to Ls,j with probability 1
and players with channel state lower than or equal to i select a penalty lower than or equal to Ls,j with probability
0 at node s. Thus, the expected payoff to a primary when it selects penalty Ls,j at channel state i at node s is
(fi(Ls,j)− c)W (γs,j+1) (98)
November 21, 2018 DRAFT
50
Note that fj(Ls,j) > c by (96).
Since expected payoff at x is strictly higher compared to the expected payoff at Ls,i at node s at channel state i
and Ls,i = Ls,j , thus, we have from (97) and (98)
(fi(x)− c)P (A) > (fi(Ls,j)− c)W (γs,j+1) (99)
On the other hand, the expected payoff that a primary will obtain when it selects penalty x at node s at channel
state j-
(fj(x)− c)P (A)
> (fj(x)− c)fi(Ls,j)− c
fi(x)− c W (γs,j+1) (from(99))
> (fj(Ls,j)− c)P (A1)
(from(2)as i ≥ j, fj(Ls,j) > c, x > Ls,j) (100)
which contradicts the fact that Ls,j is a best penalty response at channel state j.
Case ii x < Ls,i:
Note that, if αs,j = 0 forall j > i, then it is trivial that this case can not arise17. We only consider the scenario when
αs,j > 0 for some j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}. Note that fi(x) > c. Now let, k = min{j > i : αs,j > 0}. By definition of
k and observation 5 Ls,i = Us,k. Since αs,k > 0, thus expected payoff at Us,k is the maximum expected payoff at
node s when the channel state is k (theorem 1). Expected payoff to a primary channel state k at Ls,i is
(fk(Ls,i)− c)P (A2)
where P (A2) denotes the probability of winning when a primary offers penalty Ls,i at node s. Since probability
of winning does not depend on the channel state, hence, expected payoff to a primary at channel state i and at
penalty Ls,i is
(fi(Ls,i)− c)P (A2) (101)
Let, probability of winning at penalty x at node s be P (A3). Since, probability of winning does not depend on the
channel state , thus expected payoff to a primary when it offers penalty x at channel state k and at node s is
(fk(x)− c)P (A3)
Similarly expected payoff at node s, at channel state i and at penalty x is-
(fi(x)− c)P (A3)
Since Ls,i is a best penalty response to channel state k at node s, thus
(fk(Ls,i)− c)P (A2) ≥ (fk(x)− c)P (A3) (102)
17In this case, Ls,j = Ls,i (by observation 5) for all j > i. Thus, expected payoff at any penalty strictly less than at Ls,i will yield strictly
lower payoff compared to payoff at Ls,i
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From (101), expected payoff at Ls,Zs,i at node s and at channel state i is given by
(fi(Ls,i)− c)P (A2)
≥ (fi(Ls,i)− c)P (A3) fk(x)− c
fk(Ls,i)− c (from(102))
> (fi(x)− c)P (A3)
(Using(2)asi < k, Ls,i > x, fi(x) > c) (103)
which contradicts the fact that expected payoff at x is higher compared to the expected payoff at Ls,i when the
channel state is i.
Now, we show the result for channel state i+ 1.
If αs,i+1 = 0, then by observation 5 Ls,i = Us,i+1 = Ls,i+1. Hence, the same analysis will follow for channel
state i+ 1. On the other hand if αs,i+1 > 0 which along with Ls,i = Us,i+1 (by (96) implies that Ls,i is the upper
endpoint of the penalty selection strategy profile for channel state i+ 1 at node s. Since the upper endpoint is also
a best penalty response by theorem 1, thus the result follows.
Now, we provide expressions for us,i,max, us,i+1,max for node s, i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} in terms of Ls,iwhich we
use to prove Lemmas 19 and 21.
Since v is a best response at channel state 1 at any node in the network by Lemma 18, thus,
us,1,max = (f1(v)− c)W (γs,1) (104)
By (96) expected payoff at Ls,i is
(fi(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) = us,i,max (105)
us,i+1,max = (fi+1(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) (106)
Lemma 19. i) For, i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, if us,i,max ≥ ur,i,max and γs,i ≤ γr,i, αr,i < αs,i, then us,i+1,max >
ur,i+1,max.
ii) If us,i,max ≥ ur,i,max and γs,i < γr,i, αs,i ≥ αr,i, then us,i+1,max > ur,i+1,max.
Proof: First we show part (i). Proof of part (ii) follows by simple modification of the proof of part (i).
Suppose, the statement is false, i.e. us,i+1,max ≤ ur,i+1,max for some s and r. As γs,i ≤ γr,i thus,
γs,i+1 + αs,i ≤ γr,i+1 + αr,i (by observation 4)
γs,i+1 < γr,i+1 (since αs,i > αr,i) (107)
Now, as us,i+1,max ≤ ur,i+1,max, hence from (106)
(fi+1(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) ≤ (fi+1(Lr,i)− c)W (γr,i+1)
W (γs,i+1)
W (γr,i+1)
≤ fi+1(Lr,i)− c
fi+1(Ls,i)− c (108)
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Since γr,i+1 > γs,i+1 (from (107)) W (·) is strictly decreasing, thus W (γr,i+1) < W (γs,i+1). Since fi+1(·) is
strictly increasing, thus we obtain from (108) Ls,i < Lr,i. Now, from (108) and the fact that fi(Ls,i) > c , we
obtain
W (γs,i+1)
W (γr,i+1)
<
fi(Lr,i)− c
fi(Ls,i)− c (from (2) and Ls,i < Lr,i)
(fi(Ls,i)− c)W (γs,i+1) < (fi(Lr,i)− c)W (γr,i+1)
us,i,max < ur,i,max (from (105))
which contradicts the fact that us,i ≥ ur,i.
Note that, if γs,i < γr,i and αs,i ≥ αr,i, then we also obtain (107) by simple algebraic manipulation, hence the
proof of part (ii) is exactly similar to the proof of part (i).
We use the following result in proving lemma 21.
Lemma 20. Suppose us,k,max > ur,k,max, γs,k < γr,k. Let, i = min{j ∈ {k, . . . , n} : αs,j < αr,j}, then ∀j such
that k ≤ j ≤ i, we must have us,j,max > ur,j,max.
Proof: Suppose the statement is false. So, there exists a j such that k < j ≤ i, us,j,max ≤ ur,j,max18. Since
us,k > ur,k, thus, there must exist a k1 ∈ {k, . . . , j − 1}, such that us,k1,max > ur,k1,max but us,k1+1,max ≤
ur,k1+1,max. Because otherwise we have us,j,max > ur,j,max.
Since γs,k < γr,k, thus from observation 4
γs,k1 +
k1−1∑
j=k
αs,j < γr,k1 +
k1−1∑
j=k
αr,j (109)
By definition of i, αs,k2 ≥ αr,k2 for k ≤ k2 < i, since k1 < j and j ≤ i, thus αs,k2 ≥ αr,k2 ∀k2 ∈ {k, . . . , k1}.
Hence, from (109), we have γs,k1 < γr,k1 .
But αs,k1 ≥ αr,k1 and us,k1,max > ur,k1,max, hence by lemma 19 we have us,k1+1,max > ur,k1+1,max which
leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 21. Suppose, us,j,max > ur,j,max, then there must exist a state i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that us,i,max > ur,i,max
but αs,i < αr,i.
Proof: First we show that the statement is true when us,1,max > ur,1,max (case i) and then we show when
us,1,max ≤ ur,1,max (case ii); which completes the proof.
Case 1: Suppose us,1,max > ur,1,max. Since, W (·) is strictly decreasing, thus from (104) we obtain γs,1 < γr,1.
Thus, from (94), there must exist k = min{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : αs,i < αr,i}. By lemma 20, us,j,max > ur,j,max ∀j
such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Since at k, αs,k < αr,k, us,k,max > ur,k,max thus, the statement is true for k.
18Note that the statement is true at state k, since us,k,max > ur,k,max
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Case 2 Now, assume that us,1,max ≤ ur,1,max. Hence, it is obvious that j 6= 1. So, we must have k = min{i ∈
{1, . . . , j − 1} : us,i,max ≤ ur,i,max, us,i+1,max > ur,i+1,max}. Note that if γs,k+1 < γr,k+1, then from (94) there
must exist i = min{j : {k + 1, . . . , n} : αs,j < αr,j}. Since us,k+1,max > ur,k+1,max, thus by lemma 20 at i,
us,i > ur,i but αs,i < αr,i. Thus, the result is true for i if we show that γs,k+1 < γr,k+1. Now we complete the
proof by showing that γs,k+1 < γr,k+1.
Suppose that γs,k+1 ≥ γr,k+1. By definition of k, us,k ≤ ur,k, hence we obtain from (105)
(fk(Ls,k)− c)W (γs,k+1) ≤ (fk(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) (110)
Since us,k+1,max > ur,k+1,max, thus from (106)
(fk+1(Ls,k)− c)W (γs,k+1) > (fk+1(Lr,k)− c)W (γr,k+1) (111)
Sinceγs,k+1 ≥ γr,k+1 and W (·) is strictly increasing, hence, Lr,k < Ls,k from (111). Thus from (111)
W (γs,k+1)
W (γr,k+1)
>
fk(Lr,k)− c
fk(Ls,k)− c (112)
(from(2)as c < fk(Lr,k), Ls,k > Lr,k)
But (112) contradicts (110). Hence, γs,k+1 < γr,k+1.
2) Properties of any symmetric NE strategy profile in a linear graph (lemmas 23 and 24): We consider a
linear graph (fig. 1) consisting of M number of nodes. We use the properties of linear graph and a NE strategy
profile to prove the results. First, we state and prove Lemma 22. Subsequently, we show that under an NE strategy
profile the maximum expected payoff to a primary at a channel state at each node of Ik, k ∈ {1, 2} must be equal
(Lemma 23). Then, we show that under an NE strategy profile nodes of Ik, k = {1, 2} are selected with equal
probability (Lemma 24). Finally, we show theorem 6 using lemmas 23 and 24.
In order to prove Lemma 22 we state and prove Observations 6,7,and 8.
Observation 6. An NE independent set selection strategy profile only selects a maximal independent set with
positive probability.
Proof: Suppose not; so an independent set I has been chosen with positive probability under an NE strategy
profile, but it is not maximal which in turn implies that there exists a node z, such that I¯ = I ∪ {z} is an
independent set. Since
∑n
j=1 qj = q < 1 (from (10)), hence at node z, primary 1 will attain at least a payoff of
(fj(v) − c)W (q) > 0 for state j when the primary selects the highest possible penalty v. Hence, a primary can
attain strictly higher payoff by choosing independent set I¯ compared to I . Hence, the result follows.
Observation 6 enables us to focus only on the maximal independent sets for an NE strategy profile.
Observation 7. For a maximal independent set I-
(i) If s ∈ I , but s+ 2 /∈ I , then s+ 3 ∈ I for some s ∈ V .
(ii) If s+ 2 ∈ I , but s /∈ I , then s− 1 ∈ I for some s ∈ V .
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Proof: part (i): If it is not then I ∪ {s + 2} is maximal, since s + 1 /∈ I (as s ∈ I and I is an independent
set); which contradicts that I is maximal.
part (ii): If it is not then I ∪ {s} is an independent set since s − 1 /∈ I, s + 1 /∈ I which contradicts that I is
maximal.
Observation 8. Consider an independent set I , such that s ∈ I , but s+ 2 /∈ I , for some s ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 2}; NE
independent selection strategy profile selects I with positive probability, the following condition must be satisfied
for s ≤M − 3
us,j,max ≥ us+1,j,max, us+3,j,max ≥ us+2,j,max for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (113)
Proof: Note that if s = M − 2, then I does not contain node M,M − 1, hence I is not maximal. Thus, an
NE strategy profile can not select I by Observation 6. Hence, we must have s ≤M − 3.
If us,j,max < us+1,j,max, then we can replace node s with node s + 1 and we obtain an independent set I¯ as
s+ 2 /∈ I . But, we can get strictly higher payoff at the independent set I¯ , as all the nodes are same except s and
us,j,max < us+1,j,max. This contradicts that NE strategy profile selects I with positive probability.
Similarly if us+3,j,max < us+2,j,max then we obtain an independent set by replacing node s + 3 with s + 2 in
I and can get a strictly higher payoff at that independent set.
Lemma 22. i) If us,k,max > us+2,k,max, then u1,i,max > u3,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
ii)If us,k,max < us+2,k,max, then uM,i,max > uM−2,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof: We prove (i). The proof of (ii) will be similar to the proof of part (i) by symmetry.
Since us,k,max > us+2,k,max, hence, from Lemma 21, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that us,i,max > us+2,i,max,
but αs,i < αs+2,i. Hence, there must exist a maximal independent set I such that s /∈ I , but s + 2 ∈ I , which is
chosen with positive probability in an NE strategy profile when the channel state is i. But, as I is maximal, thus,
s− 1 ∈ I from Observation 7. Also from Observation 8, we must have
us−1,i,max ≥ us,i,max, us+2,i,max ≥ us+1,i,max (114)
Since us,i,max > us+2,i,max, thus, from (114), we obtain
us−1,i,max > us+1,i,max
Hence, we obtain us−1,i,max > us+1,i,max for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} only using the fact that us,k,max > us+2,k,max.Thus,
by recurrence on the index s we obtain the result.
Next Lemma characterizes that under an NE strategy profile maximum expected payoff must be equal at every
node of Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 23. Under NE strategy profile, we must have ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}
us,j,max = ur,j,max (115)
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Proof: First, we prove α1,i ≥ α3,i, αM,i ≥ αM−2,i,∀i.
We show that α1,i ≥ α3,i ∀i; by symmetry we get αM,i ≥ αM−2,i. Suppose, α1,j < α3,j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then, there must exist a maximal independent set I such that node 1 /∈ I , but node 3 ∈ I; which is not possible
(figure 1).
Now, we are ready to prove the lemma. Suppose the statement is false. So, we must have us,j,max > ur,j,max for
some j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and s, r ∈ Ik, k ∈ {1, 2}. We rule out s < r, by symmetry it follows that s > r; which
completes the proof.
Since us,j,max > ur,j,max, we must have some a ∈ {s, . . . , r− 2}, such that ua,j,max > ua+2,j,max. Otherwise,
us,j,max ≤ ur,j,max since r − s = 2z for some positive integer z. But, this entails that u1,i,max > u3,i,max by
Lemma 22 for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which in turn entails that α1,b < α3,b for some b ∈ {1, . . . , n} (Lemma 21).
But, we have already proved that α1,b ≥ α3,b∀b ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, the result follows.
Next, lemma shows that under an NE strategy profile nodes in Ik, k ∈ {1, 2} are selected with equal probability.
Lemma 24. For state z = 1, . . . , n, αz,i = αz,j where i, j ∈ Is, s ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: Let, k be the lowest channel state, for which the statement is false. Thus, there must exist node
a, b ∈ Is, s ∈ {1, 2} such that, αa,k > αb,k, but ua,k,max = ub,k,max (by Lemma 23). First we rule out that k = n
(case i) and then k < n (case ii).
Case 1 Suppose, k = n.
By definition of k, αa,j = αb,j ∀j < k, thus from Observation 4, we have γa,1 > γb,1. Since W (·) is strictly
decreasing function, thus from (104) we obtain ua,1,max < ub,1,max; which contradicts (115).
Case 2 Now, suppose k < n.
Since ua,1,max = ub,1,max by Lemma 23, thus from (104) γa,1 = γb,1. Thus from Observation 4
γa,k +
k−1∑
j=1
αa,j = γb,k +
k−1∑
j=1
αb,j (116)
By definition of k, we have αa,j = αb,j ∀j ≤ k − 1. Hence, from (116), γa,k = γb,k. Since αa,k > αb,k,
γa,k = γb,k, and ua,k,max = ub,k,max, hence by Lemma 19, we obtain ua,k+1,max > ub,k+1,max. This expression
again contradicts (115). Hence k 6= n.
From Lemma 24, we have αs,j = αr,j = α¯k,j(let) where s, r ∈ Ik k ∈ {1, 2} j = 1, . . . , n. From Lemma 23,
we have us,j,max = ur,j,max = u¯k,j(let).
Proof of Theorem 6: First, we will show that for any NE strategy profile α¯k,j we must have
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j ≥ 1
∀j. Then, we will show that if a primary chooses a maximal independent set other than I1 and I2 with positive
probability, then we must have
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j < 1, which completes the proof.
Suppose
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j < 1 but it is an NE for some j. Since I1 and I2 constitute a partition of V , thus, the expected
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payoff that any primary at channel state j will get is the following∑
s∈I1
α¯1,jus,j +
∑
r∈I2
α¯2,jur,j
=
2∑
k=1
Mkα¯k,j u¯k,j (since|Ik| = Mk, us,j = u¯k,j , s ∈ Ik) (117)
Consider the following unilateral deviation for primary 1 at channel state j: Primary 1 chooses I1 with probability
α¯1,j and I2 with probability 1− α¯1,j . Since u¯k,j remains the same, is strictly positive, and 1− α¯1,j > α¯2,j , hence
primary 1 gets a strictly higher payoff following the above mentioned strategy by (117). This contradicts that α¯k,j
is an NE distribution.
Next, consider an NE strategy profile which selects a maximal independent set I , which has at least one node
both from I1 and I2, with positive probability. Hence, there exists a node a such that a, a + 1 /∈ I . Since a and
a+ 1 are adjacent, hence both can not appear in any independent set I¯ ∈ I otherwise I¯ can not be an independent
set. Hence, by valid distribution property, we must have
αa,j + αa+1,j ≤ 1 (118)
On the other hand for independent set I , both a, a+ 1 /∈ I . Since I is chosen with positive probability, hence from
(118)
αa,j + αa+1,j < 1 (119)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that a ∈ I1, hence a + 1 ∈ I2. Thus, αa,j = α¯1,j and αa+1,j = α¯2,j .
We have already shown that for any NE strategy profile we must have
∑2
k=1 α¯k,j = 1 which contradicts (119).
Hence, a primary can not choose an independent set which contains at least one node from I1 and I2 under an
NE strategy; since I1 and I2 constitute a partition of V ; thus, only subsets of either I1 or I2 can be selected with
positive probability. Since proper subsets of either I1 or I2 are not maximal, they can not be chosen with positive
probability under an NE strategy by Observation 6. Hence, the result follows.
E. Proof of Lemmas 13 and 14 (Section V-B)
1) Proof of Lemma 13: :In order to prove Lemma 13 first, we describe an infinite set of strategy profile SPl,r,r1 .
Subsequently, we show that every strategy profile in SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Note that at a channel state vector J , a linear graph consists of disjoint smaller linear graphs (Fig. 19). First, we
introduce some notations. Let Mi be the linear graph which starts from node i i.e. the channel is not available at
node i− 1 if i > 1 (fig. 19), but it is available at node i.
In Mi the two maximal independent sets which partition the set of nodes in Mi are: I1,i which contains the
nodes numbered i, i+ 2, . . . and I2,i which contains the nodes numbered i+ 1, i+ 3, . . .. In figure 19, Mi and Mj
constitute two disconnected linear graphs. The cardinality of Mi can be an even or odd number depending on the
number of consecutive nodes where the channel is available starting from node i. To illustrate the cardinalities of
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Fig. 19: Figure shows the linear graph Mi and Mj with |Mi| = k− i+1 and |Mj | = k1−j+1. Mi and Mj are disconnected.
The maximal independent sets in Mi is I1,i and I2,i where I1,i contains nodes numbered i, i+ 2, . . . and I2,i contains nodes
numbered i+ 1, i+ 3, . . ..
|Mi|, consider the linear graph with 4 nodes. Here, |M1| can take any value in {1, 2, 3, 4}. When |M1| = 1, then
the channel is available at node 1 but not at node 2. When |M1| = 2, then the channel is available at node 1 and
2, but the channel is not available at node 3. Here I1,1 = {1} and I2,1 = {2}. When |M1| = 3, then the channel
is available at nodes 1, 2, 3, but the channel is unavailable at node 4. Here, I1,1 = {1, 3} and I2,1 = {2}. When
|M1| = 4, the channel of the primary is available at all nodes. Thus, I1,1 coincides with I1 and I2,1 coincides with
I2 where I1 = {1, 3} and I2 = {2, 4}. Since for a given channel state vector J , the graph GJ can be partitioned
into linear graphs Mi (fig. 19), thus, a primary only needs to select strategy for each such linear graph. Thus,
Lemma 25. Obtaining an NE strategy profile is equivalent to obtain an NE strategy at each possible mean valid
graph Mi, i = 1, . . . ,M .
We use the following result to prove Theorem 13.
Observation 9. When |Mi| is odd, then the only maximum independent set is I1,i, if |Mi| is even, then both I1,i
and I2,i are maximum independent sets of Mi.
Note that when |Mi| is even, there can be other maximum independent sets apart from I1,i and I2,i19.
Now, we consider a linear graph with 4 nodes and the channel states are I.I.D. i.e. the channel is at state 1 at a
given node is w.p. q1 = q = 0.5. Let ti,j denote the probability of the event that |Mi| = j. It is easy to show the
following
t1,3 = t2,3, t4,1 = t1,1 (120)
t3,1 = t2,1, t3,2 = t1,2. (121)
t2,2 = t1,4, t1,2 = 2t1,4, t3,2 = 2t1,4 (122)
19For example, when |M1| = 4, then, the following are maximum independent sets, {1, 3}, {2, 4}, and {1, 4} where the first two independent
sets belong to I1,1 and I2,1 respectively
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t2,1 + t1,2 = t1,1, t4,1 = t3,1 + t3,2 (123)
Now, we describe an uncountable set of strategy profiles parameterized by parameters r and r1.
Strategy profile SPl,r,r1 : If |Mi| is odd, then I1,i will be selected w.p. 1. If |M1| = 2, then I1,1 will be
selected w.p. r and I2,1 will be selected w.p. 1− r. If |M1| = 4 i.e. when the channel is available at all nodes,
then I1 will be selected w.p. r1 and I2 will be selected w.p. 1 − r1. If |M2| = 2, then I1,2 will be selected
w.p.
1
2
and I2,2 will be selected w.p.
1
2
. If |M3| = 2, then I1,3 will be selected w.p. 0.75 + r and I2,3 will be
selected w.p. 0.25− r.
where r, r1 ≥ 0 are such that
2r + r1 = 0.75 &r ≤ 0.25 (124)
Since 0 ≤ r ≤ 0.25 and 0 ≤ r1 ≤ 0.75, thus, it is easy to discern that the strategy profile described in SPl,r,r1
constitutes a valid distribution. Note that there are uncountably infinite numbers of r, r1 satisfying (124). Thus, SPl
gives rise an infinite number of strategies.
Proof of Lemma 13: We first prove that for every r, r1 which satisfy (124) the strategy profile SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Towards this end we first show that under the strategy profile SPl,r,r1 the channel is offered by a primary at
every node with the same probability.
Node selection probability of node 1 i.e. α1 is
α1 = t1,1 + t1,3 + t1,2r + t1,4r1 (125)
and node selection probability of node 2 is
α2 = t1,2(1− r) + t1,4(1− r1) + t2,1 + t2,3 + t2,2/2 (126)
Node selection probability of node 3 i.e. α3 is
t1,3 + t1,4r1 + t2,2/2 + t3,2(0.75 + r) + t3,1 (127)
Node selection probability of node 4 is
α4 = t1,4 ∗ (1− r1) + t3,2 ∗ (0.25− r) + t4,1 + t2,3 (128)
Note that
2t1,4r1 + 2t1,2r = t1,4(2r1 + 4r) (from (122))
= t1,4 ∗ 3/2 (from (124)) (129)
Thus, from (125) and (126), we obtain that α1 − α2 is equal to
t1,1 − t1,2 − t2,1 + t1,3 − t2,3 + 2t1,2r + 2t1,4r1 − t1,4 − t2,2/2 (130)
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Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (120) and t1,1 = t2,1 + t1,2 by (123). Since t2,2 = t1,4 from (122), thus it readily follows
from (130) that α1 = α2. From (127) and (126) we obtain α2 − α3 is equal to
t2,1 − t3,1 + t2,3 − t1,3 + t1,4 + t1,2 − 0.75t3,2 − rt3,2 − rt1,2 − 2t1,4r1 (131)
Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (120), t1,2 = t3,2 and t2,1 = t3,1 by (121). Thus, from (131)
α2 − α3 = t1,4 + t1,2/4− 2rt1,2 − 2r1t1,4 (132)
Also note from (122) that t1,4 = t1,2/2. Thus, t1,4 + t1,2/4 = t1,4 ∗ 3/2. Thus, from (129) and (132) it readily
follows that α3 = α2. From (127) and (128) we obtain that α3 − α4 is equal to
t1,3 − t2,3 + t3,1 + t3,2 − t4,1 + t2,2/2− t1,4 − t3,2/2 + 2t1,4r1 + 2rt3,2 (133)
Note that t1,3 = t2,3 by (120). Also note that t4,1 = t3,1 + t3,2 by (123). Thus, from
α3 − α4 = t2,2/2− t1,4 − t3,2/2 + 2t1,4r1 + 2rt3,2 (134)
Since t3,2/2 = t1,4 by (122), thus, we obtain t1,4 + t3,2/2− t2,2/2 = t1,4 ∗ 3/2. Since t1,2 = t3,2 by (121), thus,
from (129) and (134) it readily follows that α4 = α3. Hence, we obtain α1 = α2 = α3 = α4.
Since node selection probability is identical across the nodes, thus, when all the other primaries select a strategy
profile in the set SPl,r,r1 , then, the maximum payoff of primary 1 at a node i is (f1(v)−c)(1−w(αi)) by Theorem 1
and (42) and this is obtained for any penalty in the interval [L1, v] with αi in place of q1 by Lemma 2. Hence, the
maximum attainable expected payoff of primary 1 at each location is the same since αi’s are identical.
Now, we show that primary 1 does not have any incentive to deviate from a strategy profile for fixed r, r1 when
other primaries also select that strategy profile.
When |Mi| is odd, then by Observation 9 I1,i is the only maximum independent set in Mi. Since the maximum
attainable expected payoff for primary 1 is the same at every node, thus, the expected payoff at I1,i is the highest
for primary 1 when all the other primaries select a strategy profile in SPl,r,r1 . Hence, primary 1 does not have any
incentive to deviate from SPl,r,r1 when |Mi| is odd since under SPl,r,r1 primary 1 selects I1,i w.p. 1 when |Mi|
is odd.
When |Mi| is even, then |I1,i| = |I2,i|. By Observation 9 both I1,i, I2,i are the maximum independent sets. Since
the maximum attainable expected payoff is the same at each node, thus, any strategy profile which randomizes
between I1,i and I2,i gives the highest expected payoff to primary 1. Thus, primary 1 does not have any incentive
to deviate from SPl,r,r1 when |Mi| is even since under SPl,r,r1 primary 1 only randomizes between I1,i and I2,i.
Though we only consider primary 1 since the every strategy in SPl,r,r1 is symmetric, hence, no primary will
have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the strategy profile for a fixed r, r1. Thus, we show that every r, r1
which satisfy (124), the strategy set in SPl,r,r1 is an NE.
Since there are uncountable number of r, r1s which satisfy (124), hence there are multiple NEs in this setting.
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2) Proof of Lemma 14: We show that SPsym is not a NE strategy profile in the above linear graph with 4 nodes
where the channel is in state 1 at a given location w.p 0.5 irrespective of the channel states at other locations. In
order to prove the result we use some of the results which we derived in the previous section to prove Lemma 13.
First, we point out the how SPsym (described in Section V-B) is different from the class of strategy profile
SPl,r,r1 (described in the previous section). Then, we show that SPsym is not an NE in this setting.
Since I1,i and I2,i are the only maximum independent sets of Mi when |Mi| = 2 by Observation 9, thus,
according to SPsym (Section V-B), when |Mi| = 2, I1,i and I2,i must be selected w.p 1
2
. Note that in SPl,r,r1
when |M1| = 2, I1,1 is selected w.p. r, and I2,1 is selected w.p. 1 − r where r ≤ 0.25. Thus, I1,1 and I2,1 are
not selected with equal probabilities even though they are of same sizes. Thus, SPsym does not belong to SPl,r,r1 .
Now we show that SPsym can not be an NE.
SPsym puts equal weight on every maximum independent sets. When |M1| = 4, then under SPsym, each of the
maximum independent sets {1, 3}, {2, 4} and {1, 4} with equal probabilities. Hence, the channel is offered at node
1 w.p. t1,4 ∗ 2/3 when |M1| = 4. Thus, under SPsym, the node selection probability is
α1 = t1,1 + t1,3 + t1,2/2 + 2t1,4/3 (135)
and node selection probability of node 2 is
α2 = t1,2/2 + t1,4/3 + t2,1 + t2,3 + t2,2/2 (136)
Now, we show that α1 > α2. Since t1,3 = t2,3 (by (120)) and 2t1,4/3 > t1,4/3, thus, we are left to show that
t1,1 > t2,1 + t2,2/2. By simple algebraic calculation for q1 = q0 = q = 0.5, we have t1,1 = 0.25, t2,1 = 1/8, t2,2 =
1/16. Hence t1,1 > t2,1 + t2,2/2. Thus, α1 > α2.
Thus, by the single location pricing strategy the maximum expected payoff attained by a primary at node 1 is
(f1(v)−c)(1−w(α1)) (from (42)) and the expected payoff attained by a primary at node 2 is (f1(v)−c)(1−w(α2))
( by (42)) when the other primaries select SPsym. Since α1 > α2 and w(·) is strictly increasing, thus, the expected
payoff at node 2 is strictly higher compared to the node 1. Thus, when |M1| = 2, if a primary selects node 2 w.p.
1, then it would attain strictly higher payoff compared to the strategy SPsym where a primary selects node 2 w.p.
1
2
and node 1 w.p.
1
2
when |M1| = 2. Hence, a primary has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from its strategy
profile. Hence, SPsym is not an NE.
F. Markov Random Field
1) Background: A Markov random field is a graphical model which represents the joint probability distributions
of random variables having Markov property. It is represented by an undirected graph H = (V,E) in which the
nodes V represents the random variables. The edges E encodes the dependencies among the random variables in
the following way: if N(A) is the set of neighbors of A, then in a Markov random field [34],
A ⊥ other random variables|N(A)
Figure 20 provides a cyclic Markov random field. Here, A ⊥ C|B,D. The channel states in a conflict graph are
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Fig. 20: A cyclic Markov Random field.
Fig. 21: The figure shows a Markov Random Field. Here the
Maximal cliques are (ABC,CD).
random variables whose values are either 0 or 1. Since the channel states at adjacent locations are likely to be
correlated, we model the correlation amongst the adjacent locations in the conflict graph using the Markov Random
field where the nodes in the Markov random field represent the channel states of the corresponding nodes of conflict
graph G. Figure 20 represents a Markov random field when the conflict graph is a cyclic graph with 4 nodes and
the values of the random variables A,B,C,D ∈ {0, 1} represent the channel states at nodes A,B,C,D of conflict
graph G respectively.
We now discuss the joint probability distribution in the Markov random field. Markov random fields provide
a compact representation of the joint probability distribution in terms of product of potential functions. Potential
functions are defined on the set of maximal cliques, C, in the graphical representation of the Markov random field
H . A potential function ζC(·) represent the values of the random variable of the maximal clique C ∈ C. For
example, in figure 20 the set {AB} is a maximal clique, thus, ζAB(a, b) denote the value of the potential function
when the random variables A = a and B = b, a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Note that ζC(·) is defined on the vector c which
represents the values of the random variables represented by nodes in the clique C. Formally, the probability of
the channel state J is given by:
qJ =
1
Z
∏
C∈C
ζC(cJ) (137)
where Z is a normalization factor and cJ denote the channel states in clique C when the overall channel state
vector is J .
For example, in figure 20 the set of maximal cliques C is AB,BC,CD,DA. The joint probability distribution
is given by
PA,B,C,D(a, b, c, d) =
1
Z
ζAB(a, b)ζBC(b, c)ζCD(c, d)ζDA(d, a)
Since A,B,C,D only take values in {0, 1}, we can represent ζ as a matrix where ζAB(a, b) denote the value of
the (a, b)th position of the matrix. For example, ζ can be the following:
ζAB = ζBC = ζCD = ζDA =
0.8 0.2
0.2 1
 (138)
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In Figure 21, the maximal cliques are (ABC,CD). Hence, the joint probability distributions are
PA,B,C,D(a, b, c, d) =
1
Z
ζABC(a, b, c)ζCD(c, d) (139)
Definition 15. The Markov random field representation of random variables is symmetric if i) the maximal cliques
are of identical sizes and ii) suppose c1 corresponds to the channel state vector of maximal clique C1 and c2
corresponds to the channel state vector of maximal clique C2, then
ζC1(c1) = ζC2(c2) (140)
for every c1 and c2 such that c1 and c2 contain the same number of 1s (and thus, the same number of 0s since
C1, C2 are of same sizes).
(138) provides an example of potential functions which are symmetric and identical. But potential functions in
Fig. 21 can not be symmetric since the sizes of the maximal cliques are different.
Now, we are ready to provide an example which satisfies Assumption 3.
2) Result:
Lemma 26. The probability distributions on the channel states satisfy Assumption 3 if
i) The channel states constitute a Markov random field,
ii) The graphical representation of the Markov random field H is the same as the node symmetric graph G,
iii) The Markov random field relation is symmetric20, and
iv) There are fixed integers r1, r2 . . . such that every clique containing j ≥ 1 number of nodes is a subset of
identical (rj) number of maximal cliques in G.
First, it is easy to discern that the condition (iv) is satisfied by a large class of node symmetric conflict graphs
including cyclic graph, infinite linear graph (Fig. 11), infinite square graph(Fig. 12), infinite grid graph (Fig. 13),
infinite triangular graph (Fig. 14). For example, in the infinite triangular graph (Fig. 22), a clique containing 3
nodes is a maximal clique and hence, it is a part of only 1 maximal clique; any clique containing 2 nodes is a
subset of 2 maximal cliques; a single node is a part of 6 maximal cliques.
In order to prove the above lemma, we first show the following for any node symmetric graph G which satisfies
condition (iv):
Observation 10. Let nj be the number of maximal cliques in G which contains exactly j nodes of GJ , then there
are exactly nj number of maximal cliques in G which contains exactly j nodes of GK , when GK is isomorphic to
GJ .
Proof: Let GJ and GK be isomorphic (Definition 12) to each other, where GJ and GK are the conflict graphs
corresponding to the channel state vectors J and K respectively. Since GJ and GK are isomorphic, there is an
20In a node symmetric graph, the maximal cliques are of the same size
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Fig. 22: Infinite triangular graphs: the black colored node is a part of 6 maximal cliques. Any clique containing two nodes is
a part of 2 maximal clique. A clique containing 3 nodes is a maximal clique in this graph.
isomorphic function F1(·) between the nodes of GJ and GK .
Suppose that there is a maximal clique C which contains j nodes of GJ . Thus, this set of j nodes is a subset
of a maximal clique. The isomorphic function F1(·) maps those j nodes into j different nodes of GK . Also note
that since these j nodes of GJ belong to a clique in the original graph G, hence they are adjacent to each other,
since F1(·) is isomorphic, thus, the mapped j nodes must also be adjacent to each other, hence that set of mapped
j nodes is also a subset of a maximal clique in the original graph G.
Suppose the statement in the result is false. Thus, there must exist a set Vj of j nodes of GJ which is a subset
of r1 number of maximal cliques in the original graph, however the mapped set of nodes F1(Vj) of GK is only a
subset of r2 number of maximal cliques in the original graph where r2 < r1. Thus, this violates the condition (iv).
Hence, r2 ≥ r1. By symmetry, we can also show that the situation where r2 > r1 can not arise. Hence, the result
follows.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 26.
Proof: Let GJ and GK be isomorphic to each other, where GJ and GK are the conflict graphs corresponding
to the channel state vectors J and K respectively. We have to show that qJ = qK . Let cJ be the channel state
vector at the nodes of C when the channel state vector is J .
Now, at channel state vector J , the potential function value at maximal clique is ζC(cJ). Thus, the channel state
vector qJand qK are given by
qJ =
∏
C∈C
1
Z
ζC(cJ)
qK =
∏
C∈C
1
Z
ζC(cK) (141)
By Observation 10, the number of maximal cliques which contain j number of nodes of GJ and GK are identical.
Note that at channel state vectors J and K, the nodes where the channel state is 1 are only the nodes of GJ and
GK respectively. Hence, the number of maximal cliques which contain exactly j number of 1s are the same (and
thus, the number of 0s since in the node symmetric graph, the size of maximal cliques are the same) in the channel
state vectors J and K. Hence, qK = qJ from (140) and (141).
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